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ARTICLES
SAVING CHARITABLE SETTLEMENTS
Christine P. Bartholomew*
This Article defies the conventional wisdom that all charitable
distributions from a class action settlement fund are types of cy pres.
Instead, it proposes a radical delineation between “cy pres remainders”
(meaning settlement funds left over after individual monetary distributions)
and “charitable settlements” (meaning money initially distributed to
charities as part of class action settlements). While both have cy pres roots,
these two settlement structures have been conflated, jeopardizing the
potential utility of charitable settlements. After articulating more precise
nomenclature for these distinct distribution methods, this Article justifies
why we must preserve charitable settlements. This defense is particularly
timely, as charitable settlements face growing attacks spurred by Chief
Justice Roberts‟s comments in the 2014 Marek v. Lane appeal. Once
unchained from the strictures of the cy pres doctrine, charitable settlements
become a tool to promote the larger regulatory objectives underlying class
action procedures, including access to justice and deterrence.
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INTRODUCTION
The next frontier of class action reform pits a legal favorite against a
legal villain. Charities have long been judicial darlings. 1 By contrast,
recent decisions demonstrate a clear disdain for class actions2 and the
lawyers who bring them.3 The two intersect in charitable class action
settlements, often called cy pres.
Charitable distributions equitably solve settlement disbursement
problems, particularly in cases where administrative costs exceed individual
compensation.4 Take, for example, a small-stakes class action settlement
where individual class members stand to recover $3. Because some class
members are difficult to locate or forego making claims, significant
settlement funds may be leftover. What should be done with the money?
To date, the standard solution is to distribute the remainder to a non-profit
or charity. In approving such distributions, courts use the cy pres doctrine,
an equitable concept that allows a court to modify trust funds used for a
specific charitable purpose when the trust is no longer viable.5

1. See, e.g., Wooton v. Fitz-Gerald, 440 S.W.2d 719, 726 (Tex. App. 1969)
(―[C]harities are favorites of the law.‖); see also In re Farrow, 602 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992).
2. See, e.g., Muehler v. Land O‘Lakes, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1370, 1375 (D. Minn. 1985)
(―The judiciary have not always been receptive to creative and efficient ways to vindicate the
rights of large groups of victims. We have now seen that many judges openly and on the
record have suspicion and disdain for class actions as a means of redress.‖); Jean
Macchiaroli Eggen, The Synergy of Toxic Tort Law and Public Health: Lessons from a
Century of Cigarettes, 41 CONN. L. REV. 561, 606 (2008) (discussing how current class
action reform ―demonstrate[s] the suspicion and even disdain with which the class action
device is viewed in some circles‖).
3. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff‟s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 671–72 n.3 (1986) (―[I]t is interesting to note the frequency with which
judicial opinions favoring new restrictions on the availability of class actions or other
remedies criticize the plaintiff‘s attorney.‖); J. Thomas Rosch, Comm‘r, FTC, Promoting
Innovation: Just How ―Dynamic‖ Should Antitrust Law Be? 19 (Mar. 23, 2010) (discussing
how ―recent Supreme Court precedent . . . has shown a disdain for the private class action
bar‖).
4. See, e.g., Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 1997); In re
―Agent Orange‖ Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 841 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Wells
Fargo Secs. Litig., 991 F. Supp. 1193, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 1998). See generally RACHAEL P.
MULHERON, THE MODERN CY-PRÈS DOCTRINE: APPLICATIONS & IMPLICATIONS 215–52
(2006) (discussing the application of cy pres in the class action context).
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003).
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Now, take a slightly different scenario. What if the parties anticipated
the low claims rate from the outset? Since the administrative costs for
distributing settlements often range from $5 to $10 per class member, such
costs could exhaust a substantial portion of the settlement fund. To solve
this problem, the parties negotiate a settlement agreement that from its
inception distributes the money to a related charity or non-profit.
This type of settlement is now in jeopardy. Just last term, in Marek v.
Lane6—an appeal stemming from a class action over Facebook‘s
―Sponsored Stories‖ feature—Chief Justice Roberts signaled his interest in
removing such settlements from the judicial toolkit. The appeal challenged
a settlement directing Facebook to distribute $6.5 million to create a nonprofit organization that provides online privacy education.7 Because of
settlement pay-out complications,8 the distribution was in lieu of any
monetary payment to class members.9 After approval from the trial court10
and Ninth Circuit,11 objectors appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.12
The Supreme Court denied the appeal13 but not before Justice Roberts
used the petition to issue a public statement against charitable class action
settlements.14 Such a statement accompanying a certification denial is
rare—particularly for Justice Roberts.15 Justice Roberts described what he
characterized as the ―disconcerting feature[]‖ of the settlement.16 Citing
legal scholarship critical of class actions,17 Justice Roberts left little doubt
about his skepticism of such settlements, noting his
fundamental concerns surrounding the use of such remedies in class
action litigation, including when, if ever, such relief should be considered;
how to assess its fairness as a general matter; whether new entities may be
established as part of such relief; if not, how existing entities should be
6. 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013).
7. Id. at 8–9.
8. Id. at 9.
9. Id.
10. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 08–3845 RS, 2010 WL 9013059 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17,
2010).
11. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2012), reh‟g en banc denied,
709 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2013).
12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Marek, 134 S. Ct. 8 (No. 13-136).
13. Marek, 134 S. Ct. at 8.
14. Id.
15. Robert M. Yablon, Justice Sotomayer and the Supreme Court‟s Certiorari Process,
123 YALE L.J. F. 551, 551–52 (2014) (noting such statements are issued just a ―handful of
times each year,‖ most frequently by Justice Sotomayor, not Justice Roberts).
16. Marek, 134 S. Ct. at 9.
17. Id. (citing Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern
Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 653–56 (2010)
[hereinafter Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief]). Professor Martin Redish has published numerous
works critical of class action mechanisms. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE
JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT
(2009); Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 71
(suggesting class actions are ―judicial blackmail‖); see also Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority As
Unity, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 565, 568 (2013) (describing Redish‘s significant contributions to
legal scholarship on class actions).
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selected; what the respective roles of the judge and parties are in shaping
a cy pres remedy; how closely the goals of any enlisted organization must
correspond to the interests of the class; and so on. This Court has not
previously addressed any of these issues. 18

Roberts‘s shot across the bow is hardly the first attack on class actions.
Procedural gatekeeping in class actions is on the rise.19
Private
enforcement of business torts is significantly more difficult than a decade
ago.20 However, the ―open invitation for objectors to bring a better case
before the court‖ is the Court‘s first strike at class actions‘ settlement
approval stage.21
Given the Facebook settlement in Lane and Roberts‘s accompanying call
to arms, questions about charitable class action settlements are ripe for
scholarly examination.22 To date, however, no scholarship or jurisprudence
has distinguished between various charitable distribution structures; instead,
the trend is to conflate multiple, distinct methods under the generic rubric of
cy pres.23
Scholars and the judiciary have explored arguments for and against cy
pres remainders, i.e., charitable distributions of leftover settlement funds.24
18. Marek, 134 S. Ct. at 9.
19. Christine P. Bartholomew, Death by Daubert: The Continued Attack on Private
Antitrust, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2147, 2163 (2014) (discussing increased procedural
gatekeeping in class actions); Sheldon Whitehouse, Restoring the Civil Jury‟s Role in the
Structure of Our Government, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1241, 1261 (2014) (―[Justice]
Roberts[‘s] Court decisions have also restricted access to class action litigation.‖); Scott
Dodson, Squeezing Class Actions, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 30, 2011, 3:35 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/squeezing-class-actions/.
20. Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, Crowd-Classing Individual Arbitrations in a PostClass Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 457 (2014) (―Over the past decade, the Supreme
Court and a number of influential circuit courts have revealed deep-seated skepticism (and
hostility) to class action litigation, finding doctrinal and policy-based rationales to support
cutting back on this potent procedural device.‖); see also Dodson, supra note 19 (―The
Supreme Court‘s 2010 Term in particular evinces both skepticism of and hostility
to class actions.‖).
21. Daniel Fisher, Roberts Puts Cy Pres Settlements in Crosshairs As He Lets Facebook
Pact Pass, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2013, 9:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/
2013/11/05/roberts-puts-cy-pres-settlements-in-crosshairs-as-he-lets-facebook-pact-pass/.
22. Partly in response to Justice Roberts‘s concerns, the Federal Rules Advisory
Committee‘s Subcommittee on Rule 23 recently circulated a draft amendment to Rule 23 to
address cy pres distributions. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, RULE 23
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 264 (2015), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2015-04.pdf.
23. See generally Wilber H. Boies & Latonia Haney Keith, Class Action Settlement
Residue and Cy Pres Awards: Emerging Problems and Practical Solutions, 21 VA. J. SOC.
POL‘Y & L. 267, 269–70 (2014); Natalie A. DeJarlais, The Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres
Solution to Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 729 (1987);
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043,
2080 (2010); Jennifer Johnston, Cy Pres Comme Possible to Anything Is Possible: How Cy
Pres Creates Improper Incentives in Class Action Settlements, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL‘Y 277,
290 (2013); Kerry Barnett, Note, Equitable Trusts: An Effective Remedy in Consumer Class
Actions, 96 YALE L.J. 1591 (1987).
24. See, e.g., Boies & Keith, supra note 23, at 269–70; DeJarlais, supra note 23;
Fitzpatrick, supra note 23, at 2080; Johnston, supra note 23, at 290; Barnett, supra note 23,
at 1596–1600. In fact, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee has recognized the debate and is
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However, distributions as in Lane, where an earmarked portion of a
settlement went to a charity, have yet to be specifically analyzed. In this
particular form, settlements are consciously structured for exclusive
distribution to third parties: charitable distributions are not reserved for
unclaimed funds but instead substitute for distributions to class members.25
This Article coins a new term—―charitable settlements‖—to describe such
distributions.
Distinguishing between cy pres remainders and charitable settlements is
not merely an exercise in semantics. Charitable settlement challenges raise
basic questions about whether the purpose of a damages class action is
compensation or social justice.
Borrowing from cy pres doctrine
requirements, some contend monetary class action settlements must always
first attempt a distribution to class members.26 This position bars most
charitable settlements. In small stakes cases, individual distribution is often
costly if not impossible.27 Some critics already have submitted draft
legislation prohibiting all charitable distributions.28
Questions about the propriety of charitable settlements impact more than
just the settlement approval phase of class actions. Challenges to such
settlements now bleed into the class certification process, with courts
entertaining arguments that class actions should not be certified if only a
charitable settlement is likely.29 For example, in Ramirez v. Dollar Phone
Corp.,30 Judge Weinstein denied class certification for a group of lowincome, non-English-speaking, immigrant calling card consumers.31
currently exploring potential options regarding such settlements. See ADVISORY COMM. ON
CIVIL RULES, supra note 22, at 27–38 (discussing various perspectives on cy pres
distributions).
25. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Checking
Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2011); In re Toys ―R‖ Us
Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 347, 353–54 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
26. See, e.g., Boies & Keith, supra note 23, at 281 (―[A] cy pres distribution of residual
funds to a third party is permissible only when it is not feasible to make distributions to class
members in the first instance or to make further distributions to class members.‖).
27. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 23, at 2079; see also Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons
from the Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by
State Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361, 393 (1999) (―Sometimes funds remain
undistributed because the costs of distribution outweigh the individual share to which
each . . . group member is entitled.‖); Goutam U. Jois, The Cy Pres Problem and the Role of
Damages in Tort Law, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL‘Y & L. 258, 264 (2008) (―[T]he costs of
identifying and notifying the class members may be higher than the amount of their potential
recovery, such that notifying the members would deplete the entire fund.‖).
28. Lawyers for Civil Justice‘s draft legislation aims to limit charitable settlements by
attacking them on two fronts. See LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TO RESTORE A RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CLASSES AND THEIR ACTIONS: A CALL FOR MEANINGFUL REFORM OF RULE 23
(2013),
available
at
http://www.reedsmith.com/files/uploads/DrugDeviceLawBlog/
LCJ%20Comment_Class%20Action%20Reform_8-9-13.pdf. The first proposal would flatly
prohibit any settlement that distributed funds to non-class members. Id. at 8–9. In the
alternative, the legislation pushes for extreme reform by denying class attorneys
compensation for funds given to nonclass members, thus undercutting the likelihood that
small-stakes cases will be brought in the future. Id. at 23.
29. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Dollar Phone Corp., 668 F. Supp. 2d 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
30. 668 F. Supp. 2d 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
31. Id. at 467.
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Individually, alleged damages were minimal32—making this a case wellsuited for a charitable distribution in place of direct compensation.
However, the court held that because consumers suffered only small
individual damages, a class action was not superior to other avenues of
redress, such as legislative reform.33 Accordingly, resolving how charitable
settlements provide class members valuable relief is imperative for
settlement approval and for class certification inquiries.
This Article sounds a different note, demonstrating how taking charitable
settlements off the table would effectively gut the use of class actions for
private enforcement of laws designed to protect consumers.34 The Article
proceeds as follows. Part I details judicial response to cy pres remainders
and charitable settlements, explaining their shared origin, but more
importantly, exploring the practical and conceptual differences between the
two. It proposes the term ―charitable settlements‖ to highlight these
important differences. Part II defends charitable settlements, detailing their
equitable and theoretical justifications. In doing so, Part II details, and then
debunks, criticism of such settlements. With the theoretical roadblocks
cleared, Part III identifies discrete and practical alterations to judicial
evaluation of charitable settlements. These revisions strike a balance
between saving charitable settlements and maintaining rigor in the
settlement approval process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e).
I. CHARITABLE SETTLEMENTS IN CLASS ACTIONS
Understanding charitable settlements requires some background on the cy
pres doctrine and class action settlements. This part discusses: (1) the rise
of charitable distributions and (2) judicial evaluation of charitable
settlements.
A. The Rise of Charitable Distribution
Like many other areas of law, class actions are likely to settle before
trial.35 All federal class action settlements are evaluated by the same
standard, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), which requires ―fair,
reasonable, and adequate‖ settlements.36
While courts encourage
32. Id. at 450 (noting the named class representative‘s claim would be for approximately
$2).
33. Id. at 468 (―In the present case, the only adequate and appropriate way to protect the
rights of the Rule 23(b)(3) class is through regulation and enforcement by a federal
administrative agency.‖).
34. See, e.g., In re Serzone Prods. Liab. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 221, 240 (S.D. W. Va. 2005)
(―A class action significantly reduces the overall cost of complex litigation, allowing
plaintiffs‘ attorneys to pool their resources and requiring defendants to litigate all potential
claims at once, thereby leveling the playing field between the two sides.‖ (citing In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1984))); see also William B.
Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 433 (2001) (―Class
actions can reduce disparities in bargaining power between plaintiffs and defendants.‖).
35. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:1 (5th ed. 2014).
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). This standard equally applies post-certification and to
classes certified for settlement purposes.
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settlements,37 the approval process is extensive.38 Courts consider: (1) the
litigation‘s complexity and duration; (2) the class‘s reaction to the
settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings; (4) the risks of establishing
liability and damages; (5) the risks of maintaining a class action; (6) the
defendant‘s ability to withstand a greater judgment; (7) the settlement‘s
reasonableness in light of the best recovery; and (8) its reasonableness in
light of all the attendant risks of litigation.39
If the proposed settlement satisfies these criteria, the court grants
preliminary approval.40 It is then vetted by class members, who are notified
of the pending settlement.41 Disgruntled class members must elect one of
two options: (1) they can opt out of the settlement, which preserves their
due process rights and allows them to bring a subsequent suit for the alleged
misconduct; or (2) they can object.42 Once a class member opts out, he
37. See RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, § 13:1 (noting that there is a ―strong judicial
policy in favor of class action settlement‖) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., In re
HealthSouth Corp. Secs. Litig., 572 F.3d 854, 862 (11th Cir. 2009) (―Public policy strongly
favors the pretrial settlement of class action lawsuits.‖ (quoting U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967
F.2d 489 (11th Cir. 1992))); Robinson v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 566 F.3d 642, 648 (6th
Cir. 2009) (―[P]ublic policy strongly favors settlement of disputes without
litigation . . . . Settlement agreements should therefore be upheld whenever equitable and
policy considerations so permit.‖ (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Mustangs Unlimited, Inc., 487
F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 2007))); Macedonia Church v. Lancaster Hotel, LP, No. 05-0153
(TLM), 2011 WL 2360138, at *9 (D. Conn. June 9, 2011) (―Federal courts strongly favor
and encourage settlements, particularly in class actions and other complex matters, where the
inherent costs, delays, and risks of continued litigation might otherwise overwhelm any
potential benefit the class could hope to obtain.‖).
38. Class actions pursued under Fair Labor Standards Act section 216(b) are beyond the
scope of this Article. Section 216(b) does not apply in this case because it deals specifically
with claims for minimum wages or overtime pay. See, e.g., Sari M. Alamuddin et al.,
Differences Between Rule 23 Class Actions and FLSA § 216(B) Collective Actions; Tips for
Achieving Class and Collective Action Certification: And Certification Post-Dukes, 890
PRACTISING L. INST. 293 (2012). Unlike compensatory Rule 23 cases, where class members
generally are included unless they opt-out of the settlement, section 216(b) claims are
described as ―opt-in‖ actions because party plaintiffs must give written consent to become a
party in the action. Id. at 301.
39. Some courts reference these factors by different names (e.g., the Reed factors and the
Girsh factors). Despite different names, what each list of factors evaluates is common.
Compare In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 232–33 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Girsh v.
Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975)) (Girsh factors), with In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig
―Deepwater Horizon,‖ 295 F.R.D. 112, 146 (E.D. La. 2013), and In re Heartland Payment
Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1063 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
40. See, e.g., Cook v. Howard Indus., Inc., No. 2:11CV199-KS-MTP, 2013 WL 943664,
at *2 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 11, 2013); Wallace v. Powell, 288 F.R.D. 347, 371 (M.D. Pa. 2012);
In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 619, 633 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1) (requiring the court to direct notice to ―all class
members who would be bound by the proposal‖). The purpose of such notice is to permit
absent class members an opportunity to review the settlement terms and be heard if they
want to object or respond to the proposed settlement. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am.
Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 326–27 (3d Cir. 1998); Diaz v. Trust Territory of Pac.
Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1989).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4)–(5). Opt-out numbers matter. First, as part of the settlement
approval, courts often inquire about the number of opt-outs as an indicator of the fairness of
the settlement. Second, some settlements are structured to include ―blow provisions‖—
meaning if there are too many class members who opt-out, the settlement is no longer
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loses standing to object to the settlement.43 After hearing objections, the
court decides whether to grant final approval.44
Once the settlement is approved, eligible class members usually stand to
receive a monetary distribution. However, given the representative nature
of class action suits, many class members cannot be located or are either
unable or unwilling to satisfy claim requirements.45 Some class members
never learn of the settlement46 or forego filing claims.47 Even with directly
mailed settlement checks, some are returned or never cashed.48 Other
times, the claim‘s process costs exceed individual settlement amounts. This
is particularly true with low individual damage cases (often called ―smallstake claims‖), where the time and effort involved may not incentivize class
members to submit claims.49
Hence, distribution of settlement funds is a key issue in any damages
class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).50 When
settlement funds cannot be distributed to class members, courts can return
the money to defendants (―reverters‖); let the money escheat to the state
(―escheatment‖); or find an equitable way to distribute the money under the
cy pres doctrine.51
Of these, courts often reject reverters and

binding. See, e.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 1993).
Hence, opt-outs serve as a stopgap for potentially problematic settlements.
43. See Mayfield v. Barr, 985 F.2d 1090, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1993); New Mexico ex rel.
Energy & Minerals Dep‘t v. U.S. Dep‘t of the Interior, 820 F.2d 441, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
see also Jenson v. Cont‘l Fin. Corp., 591 F.2d 477, 482 n.7 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Sunrise
Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 450, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1990); RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, § 13:23.
44. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.635 (2004).
45. See MARCY HOGAN GREER, A PRACTITIONER‘S GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS 37 (Supp.
2012).
46. See, e.g., Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1306
(9th Cir. 1990) (―[A] substantial number of class members would never be located for
distribution of the damage award.‖).
47. See, e.g., SEC v. Bear Sterns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2009);
Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 557 F. Supp. 1091, 1104 (N.D. Ill. 1983). Foregoing claims
filing is a particular problem for elderly or ill class members. Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres
in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 104 (2014).
48. See, e.g., All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 330 (5th Cir. 2011) (―The
settlement administrator sent checks to the last known addresses of plaintiffs, but many were
returned as undeliverable or were never cashed.‖); Powell v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 119 F.3d 703,
707 (8th Cir. 1997) (―[O]ver 125 checks were returned as undeliverable.‖).
49. See, e.g., Nachsin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2011); Fitzpatrick,
supra note 23, at 2080 (―[S]ometimes the amounts class members are entitled to under the
judgment are so small that they do not come forward to claim their awards.‖).
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (setting forth the requirement for a monetary damages class
action). The 1966 Amendment to Rule 23 resulted in larger classes, which correspondingly
made it more difficult to reach all class members. See Johnston, supra note 23, at 281
(discussing how the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules resulted in increased use of class
action procedures). This amendment resulted in the growth of class actions in the 1970s. Id.
It was during the rise of class actions that problems with the one plaintiff/one check
settlement model came to light. Id. This Article focuses exclusively on 23(b)(3) class
actions.
51. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, § 12:28; see also Six (6) Mexican Workers, 904
F.2d at 1307.
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escheatment.52 Reverters undermine class actions‘ deterrence goals, while
escheatment is overly cumbersome and risks only benefiting local
governments rather than advancing the goals of the underlying claims.53
Consequently, courts instead approve settlements that provide alternative
distributions under an expansive interpretation of the cy pres doctrine.54
Cy pres, meaning ―as near as possible,‖55 is an equitable doctrine that
allows the court to modify trust funds used for a specific charitable purpose
when the trust is no longer viable.56 Goree v. Georgia Industrial Home57
provides a discrete example. There, the testator bequeathed money to ―the
Central Howard Association, an Orphan‘s Home located in Macon,
Georgia.‖58 However, no such association existed. Consequently, the court
applied the cy pres doctrine, modifying the trust to allow the money to help
orphaned children in Macon, Georgia.59
While the cy pres doctrine originated from trust law over a century ago, it
since has been used in a variety of contexts—including class actions.60
Courts have used cy pres as a shorthand for many different class action
settlement structures during the last thirty years. Such options once
included price rollbacks, discounts, and coupons.61 But these distribution

52. See, e.g., In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig. (No. II), No. 1206 (MDL), 2007 WL
4377835, at *18 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2007) (rejecting escheatment); Sylvester v. CIGNA
Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 34, 46 (D. Me. 2005) (rejecting settlement involving reverter);
accord Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir. 2004) (labeling a
reversion provision a ―questionable feature‖ of a settlement agreement); Sylvester, 369 F.
Supp. 2d at 52 (―[R]everter clauses are generally ‗suspect‘ and need to be viewed cautiously
since they ‗undercut the deterrent effect of class actions . . .‘‖); Zawikowski v. Beneficial
Nat‘l Bank, No. 98 C 2178, 2001 WL 290402, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2001) (―[R]eversion
provisions need careful scrutiny.‖). But see In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., No.
12-15705, 2015 WL 846008, at *8 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2015) (permitting reverter).
53. See Boies & Keith, supra note 23, at 269; 2 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN
ON CLASS ACTIONS § 8:15 (10th ed. 2013) (―[A]n earmarked distribution to the government
is cumbersome because it entails government involvement.‖).
54. See, e.g., In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1395
(N.D. Ga. 2001) (―[T]he substantive policies underlying the statutes upon which the
plaintiffs sued would dictate a preference for an appropriate cy pres distribution rather than a
reversion of undistributed funds to the defendant, the alleged wrongdoer.‖ (quoting HERBERT
B. NEWBERG & ALBA C. CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.20 (3d ed. 1992))).
55. RONALD CHESTER ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 431 (2000) (quoting
Brudenell v. Elwes, 102 Eng. Rep. 171, 174 (1801)).
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003).
57. 200 S.E. 684 (Ga. 1938).
58. Id. at 684–85.
59. Id. at 686.
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (―Occasionally, the term ‗cy pres‘ is
casually used to refer to reformations or judicial modifications in other contexts in which
some modified effect is given to dispositions that would otherwise exceed what the law
allows.‖); cf. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation
Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 437 (2005) (applying the cy pres doctrine to
donated conservation easements).
61. See Theodore H. Frank, Cy Pres Settlements, CLASS ACTION WATCH, Mar. 31, 2008,
at 1; Johnston, supra note 23, at 292.
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methods fell out of favor because they often advantage defendants by
generating new sales out of alleged misconduct.62
Concerns about nonmonetary distributions spurred courts and the
judiciary to limit such settlements, particularly for coupon deals. In 2005,
the Class Action Fairness Act63 (CAFA) created significant obstacles for
settlement approval. Because of these restrictions, by 2008 the term cy pres
generally referenced any settlement where funds went to a charity or a nonprofit because of distribution problems—a settlement structure CAFA was
notably silent on.
Rather than recognizing different forms of charitable distributions, courts
and scholars universally call any class action settlement where money goes
to charities or non-profits ―cy pres.‖ In some instances, courts use cy pres
to signify the distribution of leftover settlement funds.64 Other times, cy
pres means settlements given entirely to charity.65 Still other times, cy pres
means settlements where the money is split between class members and a
designated charity.66
In some ways, this generic phrase makes sense. All these settlements
result in third party disbursements, solve distribution problems, and extend
from courts‘ equitable power. However, in actuality, courts are approving
two different types of charitable distributions: (1) cy pres remainders; and
(2) charitable settlements. Though this Article is the first to make this
distinction, the delineation is justified.
Cy pres remainders result from settlements where all the funds are
intended to be distributed to class members. For example, take a $30
million settlement that gives each of the five million class members $6. In
small-stake settlements, roughly 10 percent of class members submit

62. See Severin Borenstein, Settling for Coupons: Discount Contracts As Compensation
and Punishment in Antitrust Lawsuits, 39 J.L. & ECON. 379, 399 (1996) (explaining how
coupons may give defendants a competitive advantage); Christopher R. Leslie, A MarketBased Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation,
49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1039 (2002) (same).
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012). See generally Andrew McGuiness & Richard Gottlieb,
New Class Action Law Contains Pitfalls for Defendants, 28 CHI. LAW. 60 (2005) (discussing
coupon settlement provisions in CAFA).
64. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 31–32
(1st Cir. 2009); Simon II Litig. v. Philip Morris USA, 407 F.3d 125, 131 (3d Cir. 2005); In
re Mex. Money Transfer Litig., 267 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2001); Diamond Chem. Co. v.
Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., No. 01-2118 (CKK), 2007 WL 2007447, at *1 (D.D.C. July 10,
2007).
65. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2012) reh‟g en banc denied, 709
F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2013); see also New York v. Reebok Int‘l Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 532, 534
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (settlement distributed to state recreational activities and facilities); In re
Toys ―R‖ Us Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 347, 353–54 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (distributing $57
million to charity and schools); In re Vitamin Cases, 107 Cal. App. 4th 820, 831–32 (2003)
(affirming charitable distribution as entire settlement).
66. See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132, 141 n.10 (2d. Cir.
2005); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1354–57 (S.D. Fla.
2011); Stanley v. U.S. Steel Co., No. 04-74654, 2010 WL 299493, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 20,
2010).
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claims.67 Hence, a significant pot of money is leftover—the amount of
which varies depending on how many class members make a claim, but
here it would be close to $27 million. That leftover pot is then distributed
to a charity or non-profit, a distribution this Article calls a cy pres
remainder. The settlement attempted to distribute directly to class
members, which partly failed, so the court substituted a different recipient
using its equitable powers.68 Analogically, this is similar to courts‘ power
in charitable trusts, thus justifying the cy pres label.69
In contrast, charitable settlements involve the settlement itself, not just a
remainder, making them analytically distinct from cy pres. Severing
charitable settlements from cy pres recognizes notable differences between
the distribution methods.70 Charitable settlements do not rely on failed
distributions; rather, the original settlement specifically designates money
to go to a non-profit or charity.71 Consequently, charitable settlements are
purely a solution to distribution problems and, at most, an extension of the
equitable principles underlying the trust doctrine of cy pres—rather than an
extension of the doctrine itself.
67. See, e.g., Walter v. Hughes Commc‘ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC, 2011 WL 2650711, at
*13 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2011) (―[A]verage claims submission rates in similar class actions are
typically ten percent or less.‖); Declaration of Shannon R. Wheatman, Kendrick v. Standard
Fire Insur. Co., Nos. 2:06-CV-00141(DLB), 2:08-CV-00129(DLB), 2010 WL 4168582, at
*1 (E.D. Ky. June 28, 2010) (―Typical claims rate are well under 5% so, in my opinion, a
claims rate over 10% is very high.‖). These low claim rates are likely attributable to the
reality that ―individuals are not risk averse with respect to small losses.‖ Fitzpatrick, supra
note 23, at 2067.
68. See, e.g., Superior Beverage Co., Inc. v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 479
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (describing charitable distributions as part of the judiciary‘s ―broad equitable
powers‖); In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1394 (N.D. Ga.
2001) (noting courts‘ broad equitable powers allow for charitable distributions).
69. See, e.g., Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 557 F. Supp. 1091, 1109 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(―We note that, because this fund already exists, the analogy between this case and the trust
law origins of the cy pres doctrine is a particularly close one.‖).
70. For example, unlike in cy pres settlement, in the charitable settlement context, there
is no settlor, meaning there is no one who originally created the fund, with an intent to create
a gift at the time of funding. See, e.g., Quinn v. Peoples Trust & Sav. Co., 60 N.E.2d 281,
286–87 (Ind. 1945); State ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Van Buren Sch. Dist., 89 S.W.2d 605, 608
(Ark. 1936). With cy pres settlements, class members had at least an indirect possessory
interest in the potential monetary distribution under the terms of the settlement. Cf. Boeing
Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 480 (1980) (―Their right to share the harvest of the lawsuit
upon proof of their identity, whether or not they exercise it, is a benefit in the fund created
by the efforts of the class representatives and their counsel.‖). Thus, they can arguably
satisfy the settlor requirement. This is not the case with charitable settlements, where the
settlement terms do not provide class members with any possessory interest. While the
defendant‘s coffers fund the settlement, the defendant does not satisfy this requirement. The
settlement represents money allegedly wrongfully obtained from the class, not a charitable
donation. Defendants‘ funding of the settlement is not wholly voluntary but rather intended
to end litigation—thus meaning they lacked the intent to create a true gift. Thus, there is no
settlor in the charitable settlement context—further justifying a distinction between the two
settlement forms.
71. See, e.g., New York v. Reebok Int‘l Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(settlement distributed to state recreational activities and facilities); In re Toys ―R‖ Us
Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 347, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (settlement distributed about or
approximately $37 million in new toys through the Toys for Tots program and established a
$20 million fund to buy books and computers for schools).
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Charitable settlements are either earmarked or wholly charitable.72
Earmarked charitable settlements designate funds for direct distribution to
class members and funds to be distributed to a non-profit or charity. For
example, the settlement in In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation73
included an earmarked settlement—the agreement split the $410 million
settlement between class members and charity.74 In contrast, wholly
charitable settlements, like the Facebook settlement Justice Roberts
questioned, give the entire settlement fund to a non-profit or charity: no
settlement portion is directly distributed to class members.75
Instead of recognizing these nuances, judicial evaluation of charitable
distributions is in a state of chaos. A discussion of judicial review of
charitable settlements—and the accompanying confusion—is the focus of
the next section.
B. Judicial Evaluation of Charitable Settlements
Rule 23(e) requires no special tests for assessing the fairness of charitable
distributions. However, because such settlements can involve significant
sums of money—often millions of dollars76—judges have generated
supplementary common law requirements. These requirements include: a
qualifying trigger; sufficient nexus; and lack of collusion.77 From there,
courts also consider how to calculate attorney fees in cases involving
charitable distributions.78 In applying these requirements and quantifying
fees, judicial interpretation differs, resulting in confusion and inconsistent
outcomes.
First, before permitting an alternative distribution, courts require some
problem exist with directly distributing funds to class members, i.e., a

72. Compare Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132 (2d. Cir. 2005) (earmarked charitable
settlement), and Stanley v. U.S. Steel Co., No. 04-74654, 2010 WL 299493 (E.D. Mich. Jan.
20, 2010) (same), with In re Netflix Privacy Litig., No. 5:11-CV-00379 EJD, 2013 WL
1120801, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013) (wholly charitable settlement), and In re Vitamin
Cases, 107 Cal. App. 4th 820, 824 (2003) (same).
73. 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
74. Id. at 1354–57. The earmarked portion reflected the portion of the class who could
not be located because of a problem with defendant‘s recordkeeping. See id. In addition to
an earmarked charitable distribution, the settlement agreement also included a cy pres
remainder for any direct distributions that failed. Id. Hence, the percentage of the overall
settlement going to charity would not be known until the end of the settlement distribution
process. Id.
75. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2012), reh‟g en banc denied,
709 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2013); see also In re Vitamin, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 831–32 (affirming
cy pres award of an entire settlement).
76. See, e.g., In re Netflix Privacy, 2013 WL 1120801, at *1 (approving $9 million
wholly charitable settlement); In re Vitamin, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 824 (approving charitable
distribution of $38 million to promote the health and nutrition of class members).
77. See, e.g., Lane, 696 F.3d at 821; Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038–41
(9th Cir. 2011).
78. See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 178 (3d Cir. 2013);
Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 435 (2d Cir. 2007); Six (6)
Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).
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―trigger‖ requirement.79 This trigger varies: some courts mandate a direct
distribution be impossible or impracticable80 while others allow mere
inefficiency to justify charitable distributions.81
Generally, cy pres remainders—where leftover funds exist after
distribution to class members—satisfy this trigger,82 but the trigger for
charitable distributions is unsettled. For net-zero cases, where the
distribution‘s administrative costs exceed class members‘ individual
monetary distributions, most courts approve charitable settlements.83
Courts are uncertain how to apply the trigger to low-sum cases, however,
where costs do not fully exhaust the settlement fund. Some courts define
the trigger requirement to require an attempted class member distribution
before any distribution to a third party can occur.84 For example, in In re
Lupron Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation,85 the First Circuit held
distributions to third parties can occur only after meeting ―the American
Law Institute‘s benchmark of ‗100 percent recovery‘ for all class
members.‖86 Other courts have a more generous trigger requirement. For
instance, the Second Circuit upheld a settlement in New York v. Reebok
International Ltd.87 without demanding any individual distribution prior to
creating a charitable settlement. Rather, it approved a wholly charitable
settlement because it would be ―impracticab[le] [to] attempt[] to distribute
the settlement proceeds among the multitude of unidentified possible
79. See, e.g., infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., In re Matzo Food Prods. Litig., 156 F.R.D. 600, 605 (D.N.J. 1994)
(allowing charitable distribution when ―distribution [is] economically impossible‖); In re
Dep‘t of Energy Stripper Well Exemption Litig., 578 F. Supp. 586, 591 (D. Kan. 1983).
81. See, e.g., Lane, 696 F.3d at 825 (―[T]here is no dispute that it would be
‗burdensome‘ and inefficient to pay the $6.5 million in cy pres funds that remain . . .‖); In re
Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 282 F.R.D. 92, 117 (D.N.J. 2012) (―Given the large number
of class members, distribution of the Settlement Fund to each member would be inefficient
and ineffective.‖).
82. See, e.g., In re Airline Ticket Comm‘n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679, 684 (8th Cir.
2002); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1254 (7th Cir. 1984); Glen Ellyn
Pharmacy, Inc. v. La Roche-Posay, LLC, No. 11 C 968, 2012 WL 619595, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 23, 2012).
83. See, e.g., Jones v. Nat‘l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d 355, 357–58 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
New York ex rel. Koppell v. Keds Corp., No. 93 CIV. 6708(CSH), 1994 WL 97201, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1994); In re Matzo, 156 F.R.D. at 605–06.
84. Courts adopting this narrow definition often reference the ALI‘s Principles of the
Law of Aggregate Litigation, which states that ―the settlement should presumptively provide
for further distributions to participating class members unless the amounts involved are too
small to make individual distributions economically viable or other specific reasons exist
that would make such further distributions impossible or unfair.‖ PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07(b) (2010). Following the ALI Principles‘ lead, the recent
Rule 23 Subcommittee Report uses similar language but alters it slightly to consider whether
―the distributions are sufficiently large to make individual distribution economically viable.‖
ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 22, at 265.
85. 677 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012).
86. Id. at 30.
87. 96 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding the charitable settlement allotted by the
Southern District of New York); New York. v. Reebok Int‘l Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 532, 534–35
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (showing how California would distribute these funds to schools, parks,
recreation departments, and community youth groups).
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claimants‖ without depleting the settlement funds.88 Thus, the trigger for
approving a charitable settlement depends on the court.
Second, the common law nexus requirement evaluates the proposed
third-party recipients.89 Most courts evaluate whether the recipient‘s
interests ―reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class.‖90 The
closer the nexus, the more gain for class members.91 For example, Cohen v.
Chilcott92 involved a $1.5 million charitable settlement from an antitrust
class claim against hormonal contraceptive manufacturers who allegedly
conspired to deny access to cheaper generics.93 The settlement required the
distribution be given to doctors, university health centers, and charities that
provide reproductive health services.94 In approving the settlement over
objections that class members should instead receive money, the court
highlighted how the distributions increased access to needed drugs—a
societal benefit intended by the underlying antitrust claim.95
How the nexus requirement applies varies by court. At least one court
has rejected the requirement altogether.96 Some courts require a close
nexus between the asserted claim and the charitable distribution, in terms of
purpose and geographic scope of the charitable distribution.97 Others focus
the nexus requirement on the underlying statute‘s purpose—not the specific
claim asserted—and the charitable distribution.98 In these courts, it is
enough for a charitable distribution to advance judicial access or consumer
88. Reebok, 96 F.3d at 49.
89. Charitable distributions have been used in a variety of ways. See, e.g., In re
EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045–46 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (―The Cash
Fund is non-reversionary . . . to fund higher education projects relating to internet privacy
and consumer protection . . . .‖); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d
1330, 1355 (S.D. Fl. 2011) (promoting ―financial literacy‖); In re Compact Disc Minimum
Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 197, 199 (D. Me. 2003) (music distributions to
libraries and educational institutions); Diamond Chem. Co., Inc. v. Akzo Nobel Chems.
B.V., No. 01 2118 CKK, 2007 WL 2007447, at *3 (D.D.C. July 10, 2007) (research on
globalization and private antitrust enforcement); C. BRUCE LAWRENCE & BARBARA
FINKELSTEIN, SPECIAL COMM. ON FUNDING FOR CIVIL LEGAL SERVS., CY PRES FOR CIVIL
LEGAL SERVICES: A REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATE FROM THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
FUNDING FOR CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES 3 (2006), available at https://www.nysba.org/
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=26860 (legal representation for indigent populations).
90. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07(c) (2010).
91. See EasySaver, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 1052; In re Eunice Train Derailment, No. 001267, 2012 WL 70651 (W.D. La. Jan. 9, 2012).
92. 522 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2007).
93. Id. at 111.
94. Id. at 112.
95. Id. at 119; accord Albert A. Foer, Enhancing Competition Through the Cy Pres
Remedy: Suggested Best Practices, 24 ANTITRUST 86 (2010) (―[B]ecause the funds will be
used to promote competition or dissuade the kinds of actions that constituted an antitrust
violation, or will benefit society in general, class members who did not assert a claim are
indirectly benefited.‖).
96. See Shapira v. City of Minneapolis, No. 06-cv-2190, 2012 WL 1438813, at *2 (D.
Minn. Apr. 26, 2012).
97. See, e.g., In re Airline Ticket Comm‘n Antitrust Litig., 268 F.3d 619, 626 (8th Cir.
2001).
98. See, e.g., Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011) (requiring a
―driving nexus‖); In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 33 (1st Cir.
2002).
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protection research; the distribution‘s use need not perfectly align with the
specific facts of the case.
A recent Third Circuit opinion has added another wrinkle to the nexus
requirement. In In re Baby Products,99 the court interpreted Rule 23 to
require a ―direct benefit‖ to class members.100 The court did not fully
explain the rationale behind this requirement beyond saying that ―in our
view . . . [charitable settlements] are inferior to direct distributions to the
class because they only imperfectly serve the purpose of the underlying
causes of action—to compensate class members.‖101 Nor did the court
clarify how direct a benefit must be, though it explicitly left open the
possibility of charitable distributions in lieu of monetary compensation.102
The third test (a lack of collusion) also has led to judicial confusion. For
this test, courts determine if the charitable settlement demonstrates the
parties acted in their own self-interest.103 Some courts have identified three
supposed indicia of collusion. These ―red flags‖ are: (1) a high percentage
of the settlement going to charity;104 (2) clear sailing provisions—whereby
defendants agree not to contest fee awards up to a certain monetary
value;105 and (3) reverters, meaning settlements where unclaimed funds
return to the defendant.106 While these red flags may have value for
evaluating a cy pres remainder, they add little value for a charitable
settlement. After all, any charitable settlement would raise the first of these
red flags because the bulk of the settlement goes to charity.
Finally, even if a charitable settlement survives this three-prong analysis,
courts differ on how to compute attorneys‘ fees. As part of the settlement
approval process, class counsel submits fee applications to reimburse for
the time and expenses spent litigating the class claim.107 The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure give district court judges the discretion to grant class

99. 708 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2013).
100. Id. at 181.
101. Id. at 169.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 175; In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946–47
(9th Cir. 2011) (vacating approval of settlement in case with ―warning signs‖ of collusion);
Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating because class
actions are ―rife with potential conflicts,‖ district courts must scrutinize a proposed
settlement to ensure that class counsel are acting ―as honest fiduciaries for the class as a
whole‖).
104. See Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 952 (7th Cir. 2006); Crawford v.
Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2000).
105. Lobatz v. U.S. W. Cellular of Cal., Inc., 222 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000)
(contending clear sailing provisions carry ―the potential of enabling a defendant to pay class
counsel excessive fees and costs in exchange for counsel accepting an unfair settlement on
behalf of the class‖); see also Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st
Cir. 1991) (―[L]awyers might urge a class settlement at a low figure or on a less-thanoptimal basis in exchange for red-carpet treatment on fees.‖).
106. In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 947; Mirfasihi, 356 F.3d at 785.
107. See Strong v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 137 F.3d 844, 850 (5th Cir. 1988)
(discussing how part of a court‘s duty in reviewing the fairness of a proposed settlement is to
review a fee request).
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counsel a ―reasonable fee award for their efforts.‖108 A fee petition‘s
reasonableness is frequently determined by using the percentage of the
settlement fund method,109 which ―resembles a contingent fee in that it
awards counsel a variable percentage of the amount recovered for the
class.‖110 In calculating settlement values, some courts treat charitable
distributions the same as money paid directly to class members, on a dollarfor-dollar basis.111 But others have discounted charitable distributions in
computing attorneys‘ fees.112
Between Rule 23(e) and the common law trigger, nexus, and collusion
tests, the settlement review process appears highly structured. In reality,
however, there is still a great deal of judicial discretion, which has led to
inconsistent decisions over similar charitable settlements and created
openings for objectors to challenge any charitable distribution.
Objections are a double-edged sword. On one side, objectors can provide
a check to ensure in-depth judicial evaluation of a proposed settlement.113
On the other side, objections can result in wasted judicial and attorney
resources. As Professor Greenberg cogently explains:
[I]n reality, all too frequently, objectors and their counsel see an
opportunity to extract money from the parties or class counsel, whose
efforts brought about the settlement, by threatening to upset or seriously
detour the settlement. Objectors make arguments that are groundless yet

108. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) (―In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable
attorney‘s fees . . . .‖).
109. In calculating fees, courts adopt one of three approaches: a percentage of the
settlement fund; lodestar; or percentage of the fund with a lodestar cross-check. The lodestar
method awards fees based on the number of hours worked on the case multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate. This figure then can be adjusted based on the risk of nonrecovery.
See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Phila. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487
F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973) (creating the lodestar approach). Some courts use the crosscheck method, which compares the first and second approaches. See, e.g., In re Prudential
Ins. Co. Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 333–34 (3d Cir. 1998). A great deal of
scholarship exists that discusses the strengths and weaknesses of these methods. See, e.g.,
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and
Efficiency in the Large Class Actions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 887 (1987) (arguing in support
of the percentage of the fund method because it ―can align [clients‘] interests with their
own‖); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth:
The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 139–47 (2006)
(arguing that lodestar cross-checks undermine optimal deterrence).
110. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,
819 n.38 (3d Cir. 1995).
111. See, e.g., Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., No. C-08-5198 EMC, 2012 WL 381202, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2012); McKinnie v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 678 F. Supp. 2d
806, 816 (E.D. Wis. 2009); Parker v. Time Warner Entm‘t Co., 631 F. Supp. 2d 242, 269
(E.D.N.Y. 2009).
112. See In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F.
Supp. 2d 1040, 1077 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (―Discounting the amount of the cy pres payment in
determining its value to the class is consistent with the nature of the indirect benefit cy pres
provides to the class.‖); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.13 cmt. a
(2010) (―[B]ecause cy pres payments . . . only indirectly benefit the class, the court need not
give such payments the same full value for purposes of setting attorneys‘ fees as would be
given to direct recoveries by the class.‖).
113. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 44, § 21.643.
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sufficient to delay the settlement approval process for months or years
unless class counsel or the parties agree to ―buy off‖ the objector or the
objector‘s counsel. Objector tactics can prove lucrative because the other
parties may prefer to ―buy off‖ the objectors rather than suffer the delay
and additional expense necessary to defeat the objection.114

At this point, objections are almost pro forma with charitable
settlements.115 Objectors have seized on the supplemental requirements for
charitable distributions developed by the courts. They challenge whether a
distribution is impracticable, the nexus is sufficiently tailored, or the
proposed recipient satisfies the nexus requirement.116 They also challenge
compensation for class counsel.117 However, the most divisive issue with
charitable settlements is whether the parties must first attempt a monetary
distribution to class members.118 Using the Third Circuit‘s ―direct benefit‖
requirement, objectors and class action critics have attacked the entire
concept of charitable settlements.119
The remainder of this Article deals with these challenges, making the
case for charitable settlements and clarifying how to evaluate them under
Rule 23(e). Part II responds to the objectors‘ argument that one must first
attempt a monetary distribution to the class before a charitable settlement
can be approved. Part III responds to the objectors‘ points regarding the
common law requirements and calculating attorneys‘ fees.
II. THE CASE FOR CHARITABLE SETTLEMENTS
The defining feature of charitable settlements is also its most contentious:
under such settlements class members forego direct compensation. While a
cy pres remainder first attempts to distribute settlement funds to class
members, charitable settlements do not. The charitable distribution is in
114. Bruce D. Greenberg, Keeping the Flies Out of the Ointment: Restricting Objectors
to Class Action Settlements, 84 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 949, 950 (2010).
115. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Netflix
Privacy Litig., No. 5:11-CV-00379 EJD, 2013 WL 1120801, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18,
2013); In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
116. See, e.g., Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (challenging
whether the proposed distribution and recipients were sufficiently tailored); Lane, 696 F.3d
at 820 (challenging, inter alia, whether distribution was impracticable); In re Lupron Mktg.
& Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 37 (1st Cir. 2012) (challenging proposed recipient).
117. See supra note 109 and accompanying text; accord In re Checking Account
Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1361 n.30 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (―[M]ost if not all of the
Objections are motivated by things other than a concern for the welfare of the Settlement
Class. Instead, they have been brought by professional objectors and others whose sole
purpose is to obtain a fee by objecting to whatever aspects of the Settlement they can latch
onto.‖).
118. Compare In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., No. 00 CV 0648, 2001 WL 170792,
at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001) (rejecting settlement as unfair for not providing initial direct
compensation), with In re Vitamin Cases, 107 Cal. App. 4th 820, 832 (2003) (stating there is
no requirement ―that a settlement allow for individual claims before its fund can be
distributed to cy pres relief‖).
119. See, e.g., Poertner v. Gillette Co., No. 6:12-cv-803-Orl-31 (DAB), 2014 WL
4162771 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2014) (challenging proposed settlement, in part, because of the
settlement does not directly benefit class members monetarily); Dryer v. Nat‘l Football
League, No. 09-2182 (PAM/AJB), 2013 WL 5888231, at *7 (D. Minn. Nov. 1, 2013).

3258

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

lieu of a payday for class members. Some courts and scholars take issue
with this result, arguing charitable settlements are per se invalid because
they do not directly compensate class members.120 This part explains why
this argument is wrong.
As a starting point, such arguments confuse cy pres remainders and
charitable settlements. While both resolve distribution problems, as
discussed in Part I, they are distinct settlement structures. Under the cy pres
doctrine, courts can substitute payouts to class members with ―the next
best‖ recipient, i.e., a charitable organization, but only if the initial
distribution to the class fails or becomes impracticable.121 In contrast, with
charitable settlements, there is no requirement for a preliminary attempt to
distribute to class members. That requirement only comes from the cy pres
doctrine, not from any explicit requirement under Rule 23(e). Requiring all
charitable distributions have an initial unsuccessful attempt to distribute
money to class members reflects an unfortunate blurring of two very
different settlement structures.
More fundamentally, though, arguing that charitable settlements must fail
because they do not distribute money to class members has larger
implications for class action jurisprudence. It subtly redefines the goals of
class actions, making compensation the only purpose of Rule 23(b)(3). The
better view is that compensation is just a by-product of a class action‘s
regulatory function.122 A class action is a procedural mechanism that
allows individuals to ―supplement regulatory agencies both by requiring
wrongdoers to give up their ill-gotten gains and by ferreting out misconduct

120. Some argue cy pres still may be an option for a remainder, but others take issue with
any charitable distribution—including cy pres. For more ardent critics, only monetary
distributions benefit class members. Compare Boies & Keith, supra note 23, at 281 (arguing
in favor of cy pres settlements but against charitable settlements), with Redish et al., Cy Pres
Relief, supra note 17, at 621–24 (arguing against all charitable distributions). Often,
portions of the American Law Institute Principles are cited to support this conclusion. See,
e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 173 (3d Cir. 2013). However, when
read in its entirety, the ALI Principles do not create a presumptive barrier but rather
recognize such distributions still may be appropriate for small-stakes cases: if the settlement
involves individual distributions to class members and funds remain after distributions
(because some class members could not be identified or chose not to participate), the
settlement should presumptively provide for further distributions to participating class
members unless the amounts involved are too small to make individual distributions
economically viable or other specific reasons exist that would make such further
distributions impossible or unfair. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07
cmt. b (2010).
121. See, e.g., Dennis, 697 F.3d at 865 (―[T]o ensure that the settlement retains some
connection to the plaintiff class and the underlying claims, however, a cy pres award must
qualify as ‗the next best distribution‘ to giving the funds directly to class members.‖); Six (6)
Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1990) (―Even
where cy pres is considered, it will be rejected when the proposed distribution fails to
provide the ‗next best‘ distribution.‖).
122. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, Consumer Class Actions: Who Are the Real
Winners?, 56 ME. L. REV. 223, 228 (2004) (―[I]t must be kept in mind that the objective of
consumer class actions is not only compensation, but also deterrence and disgorgement of
wrongful profits.‖).
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that may have escaped the regulators‘ observance.‖123 As a result, class
actions serve a larger collective good: they allow individuals to vindicate
their legal rights and deter wrongdoing, minimizing future harm.124
Therefore, there are broader regulatory goals, beyond mere compensation,
behind the federal system for aggregate litigation.
Assessing class actions with an eye toward their regulatory potential
makes particular sense for small-stakes cases. Where individual recovery is
minimal, non-compensatory goals rise to the foreground. The focus should
not be on whether a class member is compensated for his $2 injury.125
Rather, as Justice Berger described:
The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is
an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the
regulatory action of government. Where it is not economically feasible to
obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small
individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any
effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device.126

Thus, the proper question is whether the relief charitable settlements
offer fulfills the regulatory function of class actions. This part explains how
the charitable settlements promote individuals‘ opportunity to vindicate
rights and deter future wrongdoing.127
A. Charitable Settlements Vindicate Substantive Rights
Charitable settlements serve a valuable purpose, consistent with class
action goals, because they preserve putative class members‘ ability to assert
123. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION 232 (1987). The purpose of class actions have long since been debated, with some
arguing that class actions are more about autonomy and efficiency than about regulatory
goals. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence,
and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 49 (1975); see also Edward Brunet, Improving
Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL.
L. REV. 1919, 1939 (2000) (describing competing law and economic class action arguments).
However, a more practical approach recognizes both justifications as synergistic rather than
in tension. In some cases, class actions are more efficient than multiple potential cases. In
other situations, multiple cases are unlikely—particularly when potential damages hardly
cover the costs of bringing suit. In those cases, regulatory goals justify a class actions‘
utility. See, e.g., Leszczynski v. Allianz Ins., 176 F.R.D. 659, 676 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (―Class
actions are particularly appropriate, where, as here, multiple lawsuits would not be justified
because of the small amount of money sought by the individual plaintiffs.‖). Thus, because
charitable settlements primarily arise in small-stakes cases, focusing on class actions‘
regulatory function is appropriate.
124. See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality,
and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 666 (1979) (discussing ―the societal
benefits derived from deterring socially proscribed conduct and providing small claim
rectification‖ through class actions).
125. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 23, at 2067 (―[I]ndividuals are indifferent between, say a
loss of $1 and a 1% chance of losing $100.‖).
126. Deposit Guar. Nat‘l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
127. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 124, at 666 (―Even if the negative effects of class
actions were assumed, they would have to be balanced against the societal benefits derived
from deterring socially proscribed conduct and providing small claim rectification—
considerations that thus far have escaped measurement and perhaps always will.‖).

3260

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

substantive legal rights.128 Access to justice—meaning a realistic avenue to
air grievances—is an essential component of effective regulation via class
actions.129 As the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure noted, class action mechanisms ―provide means of vindicating
the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective
strength to bring their opponents into court at all.‖130 The substantive laws
primarily pursued as class actions lack a minimum damages requirement,
demonstrating Congress already has decided that even in cases where an
individual has little money at stake, he has the right to make a claim.131
Charitable settlements protect a class member‘s ability to effectuate these
statutory rights, thus providing the specific relief intended by class action
mechanisms—the ability to assert claims.132
Essentially, charitable
settlements promote access to justice by:
(1) allowing aggrieved
individuals to stand against alleged wrongdoing; (2) advancing democratic
participation; and (3) ensuring financial hurdles do not limit opportunities
to air grievances.

128. Cf. HON. WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER ET AL., FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE
TRIAL, NATIONAL EDITION Ch. 10-C (2008) (―[C]lass actions exist to enable persons of
modest means to vindicate the rights of many.‖).
129. Accord Jay Tidmarsh, Living in CAFA‟s World, 32 REV. LITIG. 691, 708 (2013) (―By
‗justice‘ I do not mean a fair determination of contested legal rights by a court. Rather, I use
justice to refer to any process that commences with aggrieved persons laying their
complaints of legal wrongdoing before a neutral party.‖); Francisco Valdes, Procedure,
Policy and Power: Class Actions and Social Justice in Historical and Comparative
Perspective, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 627, 649 (2008) (―[T]he virtue of the class action was and
is in the effort to provide access to justice—to deliver justice to those who don‘t have access
to justice.‖); cf. Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497,
497 (1969) (explaining the purpose of the 1966 Amendment of Rule 23 was to expand
access to justice ―even at the expense of increasing litigation‖).
130. See Kaplan, supra note 129, at 497.
131. Cf. Max Helveston, Promoting Justice Through Public Interest Advocacy in Class
Actions, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 749, 772–73 (2012) (discussing how restricting access to class
actions ―means that a number of the rights and protections that lawmakers have afforded
individuals are essentially unenforceable‖); Valdes, supra note 129, at 654–55 (―The class
action device does not itself seek to establish or promulgate those substantive policy choices
[reflected in substantive law]; the class action instead provides the vehicle to give them some
real-world bite. The class action, like other procedures, is a vehicle for the enforcement and
vindication of substantive rights and obligations embodied in positive policy choices that
pre-exist the class action.‖).
132. See Deposit Guar. Nat‘l. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980) (explaining that
―[t]he use of the class-action procedure for litigation of individual claims may offer
substantial advantages for named plaintiffs; it may motivate them to bring cases that for
economic reasons might not be brought otherwise‖); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (noting that class action suits allow plaintiffs to pursue
causes of action that otherwise would not be economical); James M. Finberg, Class Actions:
Useful Devices That Promote Judicial Economy and Provide Access to Justice, 41 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 353, 353–54 (1997) (―Even more importantly, [class actions] provide access to
justice. Our justice system is not a system only for the rich and powerful. It is also a system
for everyday Americans who need legal redress when they have been wronged. Class
actions give them that opportunity by allowing them to aggregate their claims and to fight
rich and powerful corporations. By aggregating their claims, they can hire the experts and
lawyers who can do the analysis that is necessary.‖).
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First, the ability to assert a right has value independent of whether class
members receive direct compensation.133 Permitting charitable settlements
allows class members to ―level the playing field‖ and hold large
corporations responsible for wrongdoing that results in small individual
damages but large aggregate harm.134 Taking a public stand matters to
class members135 and is often an overlooked benefit of charitable
distributions.136 Eligible class members can be difficult to locate,
sometimes as a result of defendants‘ faulty recordkeeping. 137 Even then,
administrative costs for individual distribution can exhaust the entirety of
the settlement fund.138 Charitable settlements overcome these issues,
ensuring substantive rights are not curtailed due to distribution
challenges.139
Second, charitable settlements advance democratic participation and
protect the perceived fairness of the legal system, as potential claims are not
precluded because of distribution problems.140 Enhancing fairness by
133. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 275 (2004)
(―[T]he value of participation cannot be reduced to a function of the effect of participation
on outcomes . . . .‖).
134. See, e.g., Helveston, supra note 131, at 772–73 (discussing how restricting access to
class actions ―means that a number of the rights and protections that lawmakers have
afforded individuals are essentially unenforceable‖); Katie Melnick, In Defense of the Class
Action Lawsuit: An Examination of the Implicit Advantages and a Response to Common
Criticisms, 22 ST. JOHN‘S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 755, 756 (2008).
135. See Stephen Meili, Collective Justice or Personal Gain? An Empirical Analysis of
Consumer Class Action Lawyers and Named Plaintiffs, 44 AKRON L. REV. 67, 90–91 (2011)
(discussing ―the desire to make a public statement about defendant‘s conduct‖ as a collective
justice motivation for named class members).
136. See id.
137. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1354 (S.D.
Fl. 2011); cf. Powell v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 1997) (permitting cy pres
because class members were no longer readily locatable because a decade passed from the
initial distribution).
138. This includes most securities, antitrust, and consumer actions. See Ilana T. Buschkin,
The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a Globalized Economy—Permitting Foreign
Claimants to be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL
L. REV. 1563, 1564 n.3 (2005).
139. Cf. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414–15 (2002) (right of access to courts
―is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by
being shut out of court‖); Cunningham v. Dist. Att‘ys Office for Escambia Cnty., 592 F.3d
1237, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010) (―[T]he plaintiff must have an underlying cause of action the
vindication of which is prevented by the denial of access to the courts.‖ (citing Christopher,
536 U.S. at 415)); Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1309 (2003) (exploring the right to a remedy through access to the courts).
140. Avenues for participation strengthen cooperation with the legal system, which in
turn encourages compliance with the legal system. Cf. Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett,
Disputants‟ Perceptions of Dispute Resolution Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post
Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 63, 72 (2008) (discussing how parties are
more willing to follow procedural requirements when perceived as fair); see also Floyd
Feeney, Evaluating Trial Court Performance, 12 JUST. SYS. J. 148, 159 (1987) (describing
research suggesting that ―decisions perceived as unfair are economically inefficient because
of the increased resistance‖ to them). When procedures are considered fair, people are more
likely to ―obey the law‖ and have greater respect for the legal system. See TOM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 368 (1990); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Disputant
Concerns in Mediation, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 367, 368 (1987).
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guaranteeing judicial access is a gain separate from (and potentially more
important than) monetary compensation—particularly to class members.141
Claimants privilege fairness of the adjudicative process over monetary
results.142 Ensuring judicial access promotes individual dignity, which is an
essential value in democratic societies.143 ―Dignity is most clearly offended
when a person believes that she is the victim of governmental arbitrariness
or private abuse and is barred at the courthouse door or forced to participate
without assistance or resources.‖144 However, these gains are undermined
when a swath of otherwise cognizable claims cannot be adjudicated because
of distribution problems.145
Third, charitable settlements overcome financial obstacles that might
otherwise limit access to justice. Often, aggrieved individuals are limited to
private litigation to redress alleged wrongdoing, as government agencies
rarely pursue small-stakes claims.146 Charitable distributions mostly occur
in cases where financial barriers make individual litigation irrational.147
Theoretically, an individual has the legal right to assert a claim but ―is
[often] shut out of the courthouse by economic realities.‖148 Few class
141. When court procedures do not prioritize constituents‘ larger needs—not just provide
monetary compensation—this triggers increased risks of discontent and mistrust of the legal
system. See, e.g., Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 140, at 72.
142. See id. at 68–69.
143. Ensuring judicial access advances values of individual dignity, which in turn
promotes a primary value of democratic societies. See Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of
Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 745 (1980); Ronald Pennock, Due Process,
Fraternity, and a Kantian Injunction, 18 NOMOS 172 (1977) (discussing the importance of
the government‘s fair treatment of individuals, including instilling dignity and self-respect).
144. Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency‟s Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for
Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 388 (1990); see also Frank Michelman, The
Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One‟s Rights, 1974 DUKE
L. REV. 527, 547.
145. See Finberg, supra note 132, at 357 (―[I]f Americans are to have faith in the judicial
system, they need to believe that they have access to the courthouse.‖); Meili, supra note
135, at 74 (―[M]any named plaintiffs have a broader view of success and fairness, measuring
them in terms of achieving social changes that extend beyond the defendant in their
particular case.‖).
146. Government enforcement ebbs and flows with an administration‘s politics or ability
to fund such efforts. See Georg Berrisch, Eve Jordan & Rocio Salvador Roldan, E.U.
Competition and Private Actions for Damages, 24 NW. J. INT‘L L. & BUS. 585, 586 (2004)
(―[P]ublic authorities lack sufficient resources to investigate and prosecute every single
infringement of competition rules.‖); Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment
in Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 207, 230 (2003) (―[E]nforcement priorities change from
administration to administration, or with appointment of a new Assistant Attorney General
or FTC chair.‖); see also Joseph P. Bauer, Reflections on the Manifold Means of Enforcing
the Antitrust Laws: Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 303,
310–11 (2004); Daniel R. Shulman, A New U.S. Administration and U.S. Antitrust
Enforcement, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 5 (2009).
147. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2012), reh‟g en banc
denied, 709 F.3d 791 (2013); In re Netflix Privacy Litig., No. 5:11-CV-00379, 2013 WL
1120801, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013); In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d
1159 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
148. Consumer Class Action: Hearings Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the S. Comm.
on Commerce, 92d Cong. 38 (1971) (statement of Sen. Frank E. Moss, Chair, S. Comm. on
Commerce).
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members can afford to undertake years-long litigation on their own,
especially when individual recovery is minimal.149 However, by allowing
class counsel to recover attorneys‘ fees based on charitable settlements,
access to justice is restored.150 Class counsel are key to assisting aggrieved
individuals bring claims.151
They often ―ferret out‖ the alleged
wrongdoing152 and advance the fees and costs necessary for suit.153 As the
Supreme Court has noted, ―[a] class action solves [the] problem‖ that
―small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a
solo action prosecuting his or her rights‖ by ―aggregating the relatively
paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone‘s (usually an
attorney‘s) labor.‖154 Instead of being fully shut out of the judicial process,
aggrieved individuals can instead participate in a representative fashion—
whereby class representatives and class counsel work together to vindicate
class members‘ rights.155
Charitable settlements also may help overcome financial hurdles to
judicial access in subsequent cases. Through the nexus requirement,
charitable settlements ensure defendants pay for wrongdoing, then
distribute that payment to a charity whose resources and experience are
used to advance interests aligned with the underlying goals of the class
action claim.156 Recognizing the access to justice purpose behind aggregate
149. See Mathias Reinmann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the
Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 817
n.351 (2003) (discussing why the high costs of discovery can work against a plaintiff as
―those with small and medium-sized claims‖ may not be able to fully pursue these claims as
the costs of discovery will often outweigh the small sum sought in the recovery); Nina
Yadava, Can You Hear Me Now? The Courts Send a Stronger Signal Regarding Arbitration
Class Action Waivers in Consumer Telecommunications Contracts, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 547, 554–55 (2008) (―Without the ability to aggregate these small sums, securing
legal representation is difficult and the financial incentive of affected individuals to bring
action is lacking when attorney‘s fees are larger than the amount in controversy.‖).
150. See David J. Cook, Class Actions and the Limits of Recovery: The Glass Jaw of
Justice (Part 1 of 2), 5 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 1, 21 (2010) (―[C]lass action plaintiffs
are heavily dependent upon the class counsel in the overall strategic and tactical
management of the case as supervised by the court.‖); Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H.
Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1186 (2009) (―For such
negative-value suits, the most important element in ensuring justice is making sure that some
agent—dare we say, any agent—will rise to the occasion to take up the case.‖).
151. See Cook, supra note 150, at 21.
152. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (enumerating criteria courts must consider in
appointing class counsel, including work to identify or investigate potential claims).
153. See, e.g., RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, § 3:69.
154. Amchen Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (citing Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
155. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Essentials of Democratic Mass Litigation, 45 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 499, 510 (2012) (crediting Judge Weinstein for describing a formal class
action as ―an expression of representative democracy‖); Deborah R. Hensler, The
Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 7,
26 (2009) (―[T]he debate over class actions implicates a more fundamental debate about the
role of the courts in policy making in a representative democracy.‖); cf. Cynthia R. Farina,
The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 987, 1037 (1997) (characterizing class actions as a type of representative democracy).
156. See, e.g., In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1052 (S.D. Cal.
2013) (discussing how the proposed charitable settlement advanced ―the objectives of the
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litigation, many charitable distributions go directly to non-profit providers
of legal services and are dedicated to providing judicial access for those
who cannot obtain or afford representation.157 Consequently, charitable
settlements provide two tiers of judicial access: (1) class members receive
the benefit of access to justice for the claim generating the charitable
settlement, and (2) they (and similarly situated individuals) also can gain
from increased access in future cases.
Focusing on compensation as the sole goal of class actions overlooks
these gains. Nonetheless, critics often try to redirect arguments about
access to justice, pointing out class actions limit participation in comparison
to traditional, non-aggregate cases.158 Because of the representative nature
of such cases, these critics are accurate in noting not every class member is
equally heard to the same degree as in individual litigation.159 However, in
the context of small-stakes claims where charitable settlements usually
occur, the comparison is not between class actions and individual litigation.
Rather it is between class actions and no litigation. In fact, as the Manual
for Complex Litigation explains, the ―[a]dequacy of the settlement involves
a comparison of the relief granted relative to what class members might
have obtained without using the class action process.‖160 Since charitable
settlements provide greater access to justice than otherwise possible, they
provide sufficiently valuable relief—even without providing class members
monetary compensation.
B. Charitable Settlements Deter Wrongdoing
Charitable settlements also deter wrongdoing, further fulfilling class
actions‘ regulatory objectives. Class actions are notably different than
individual civil litigation,161 as deterrent potential is a key reason
consumers bring aggregate claims. A study of named plaintiffs in class
actions bears out how a primary goal of such cases is ensuring that others
do not experience the same problems in the future—not just receiving
monetary compensation.162 Focusing on deterrence goals is particularly
underlying statute(s)‖); In re Eunice Train Derailment, No. 00-1267, 2012 WL 70651, at *2
(W.D. La. Jan. 9, 2012) (discussing how the proposed charitable distribution ―is intimately
connected to the objectives of this suit and the class‖).
157. See, e.g., Lessard v. City of Allen Park, 470 F. Supp. 2d 781, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2007)
(allowing charitable distribution for the Michigan Bar‘s Access to Justice Fund).
158. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The Class Action As Political
Theory, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 753 (2007).
159. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 2022 (2007) (―The class action relies on representation to satisfy
participation demands, but it is not clear how representation can substitute for personal
participation when participation is valued on dignitary grounds.‖); Alexandra D. Lahav, Due
Process and the Future of Class Actions, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 545 (2012) (arguing class
actions undermine autonomy and thus hinder dignity).
160. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 44, § 21.62 (listing over thirty
factors for evaluating a proposed settlement).
161. See, e.g., Meili, supra note 135, at 87; Tamara Relis, It‟s Not About the Money!: A
Theory of Misconceptions of Plaintiffs‟ Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 718 (2006).
162. Meili, supra note 135, at 87.
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important for the low individual value claims that most commonly trigger
charitable settlements. As Professor Isaacharoff stated, ―More critical than
the limited compensatory relief now offered in these low-value class actions
is the prospect that the law would be unable to deter future misconduct
absent an effective policing mechanism.‖163
Deterrence is an extension of class actions‘ regulatory function.164
Congress adopted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to allow individuals
to serve as private attorneys general—deterring future wrongdoing through
class actions functioning as ex-post regulation.165 Exposure to potential
liability incentivizes actors to avoid wrongdoing166 and affects widespread
change.167 For example, a company may elect to spend more money testing
a new product or invest in more compliance training to minimize potential
class action exposure.168 This deterrent effect applies not only to named
defendants but also to other industry members169 and can extend over
multiple years, so long as there is ―sustained and repeated enforcement
activity.‖170

163. Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 816 (1997).
164. YEAZELL, supra note 123, at 232; see also Lopez v. Youngblood, No. CV-F-070474, 2011 WL 10483569, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2011) (―[O]ne important purpose of the
class action device is that defendants should not benefit from their wrongdoing, and should
be deterred from doing so by being vulnerable to class actions to remedy their wrongful
conduct.‖); Abels v. JBC Legal Group, P.C., 227 F.R.D. 541, 546 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
165. See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat‘l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338–39 (1980);
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, §§ 1.1, 1.8.
166. See generally David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation
Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1890–91 (2002)
(explaining optimal deterrence maximizes society‘s total welfare by encouraging potential
wrongdoers to avoid unreasonable risks).
167. This widespread effect is not limited to consumer class actions. See Trevor W.
Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. 589, 590
(2005) (―From school desegregation to fair housing, environmental management to
consumer protection, the impact of the private attorney general litigation is rarely confined to
the parties in a given case.‖).
168. For example, in interviewing corporate representatives in 2000 (when class actions
mechanisms were more permissive), the Rand Institute found:
―Corporate
representatives . . . interviewed said that the burst of new damage class action lawsuits
ha[d] . . . caus[ed] them to review financial and employment practices. Likewise, some
manufacturer representatives noted that heightened concerns about potential class action
suits have had a positive influence on product design decisions.‖ DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET
AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN 9 (2000), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
monograph_reports/2005/MR969.1.pdf; see also Edward F. Sherman, Consumer Class
Actions: Who Are the Real Winners?, 56 ME. L. REV. 223 (2004) (providing a more
exhaustive analysis of the Rand report).
169. See Michael K. Block & Jonathan S. Feinstein, The Spillover Effect of Antitrust
Enforcement, 68 REV. ECON. & STAT. 122, 122 (1986) (discussing how antitrust deterrence is
most effective when targeted at other firms in the same industry as the violator); cf. Jared N.
Jennings et al., The Deterrent Effects of SEC Enforcement and Class Action Litigation 5
(Working Paper, 2011), available at http:ssrn.com/abstract=1868578. A 2011 empirical
study analyzed both SEC and class action enforcement of securities laws and found class
actions curb aggressive reporting behaviors of industry peers—not just the corporation sued.
Id.
170. Jennings et al., supra note 169, at 30.
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Charitable settlements are aligned with class actions‘ deterrence objective
and provide class members valuable relief by enhancing public welfare.171
Deterrence gains occur regardless of whether the defendants‘ distribution
goes to class members or third parties.172 It is the threat of litigation
coupled with monetary sanctions that matters.173 Potential monetary
exposure raises transactional costs, which motivates avoiding such behavior
in the first place.174 This is particularly true for the small individual sum
class actions best suited for charitable settlements:
[T]he primary purpose of small claims class actions is not individual
plaintiff compensation but rather aggregate deterrence of the defendant‘s
activities. Compensation is not a primary goal because each class
member has been harmed such a small amount that getting those funds to
them may be inefficient and/or class members are unlikely to spend time
coming forward to claim such small amounts. However, the aggregate
effect of the defendant‘s actions may be significant and need to be
deterred. Creating a fund that truly penalizes the defendant by fully
disgorging a significant amount of money serves this deterrent effect
regardless of where the funds are sent. 175

In fact, charitable distributions‘ deterrence value is potentially greater
than other nonmonetary relief options. Optimal deterrence does not occur
when relief comes in the form of a defendant‘s product or a service that can
be offered at little or no opportunity cost,176 such as coupon deals.177
171. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions As Pragmatic Ex Post
Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 96 (2008) (―[D]eterrence enhances public welfare by
preventing unreasonable risks that cost more to incur than to prevent.‖); Catherine M.
Sharkey, Punitive Damages As Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 365 (2003) (―Social
welfare is maximized by minimizing the sum of the costs of (1) losses produced by
accidents; (2) defendants‘ efforts to exercise care; (3) plaintiffs‘ efforts to take precautionary
measures; and (4) the costs of administering the torts (or alternative) system.‖).
172. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1355 n.24
(S.D. Fl. 2011); Rosenberg, supra note 166, at 1892 (―In seeking to minimize the sum of
accident costs, there is no necessary linkage between the determination of liability and the
distribution of damages. The two functions are severable and distinct. How damages are
distributed among plaintiffs—whether averaged, allotted by need, apportioned according to
some other criterion, or not distributed at all—is generally (with the exception of its effect on
plaintiff incentives) irrelevant to achieving deterrence.‖); cf. David Rosenberg, The Causal
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 849, 873 (1984).
173. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA‟s Impact on Litigation As a Public Good, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2550 (2008) (explaining how the threat of monetary class actions
―deters risky behaviors . . . and results in safer products and better corporate practices‖); see
also William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of the
Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 711 (2006).
174. Jennings et al., supra note 169, at 30.
175. In re Dep‘t of Veterans Affairs (VA) Data Theft Litig., 653 F. Supp. 2d 58, 60–61
(D.D.C. 2009); see also Gilles & Friedman, supra note 109, at 105 (asserting that real value
of class actions lies not in compensation but in deterring the defendant-wrongdoer by
―caus[ing it] to internalize the social costs of its actions‖).
176. Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official‟s Reflections on Antitrust Class Actions,
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 445 (1997).
177. Id.; Jois, supra note 27, at 270 n.41 (―[O]ptimal deterrence is not reached when there
are unclaimed coupons (because the tortfeasor only bears a cost if a coupon is cashed in) but
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Reverters, which provide no guaranteed payouts,178 are not better
deterrents, nor is injunctive relief.179 Instead, the potential for real financial
exposure, regardless of whether the money goes to class members, a
charity, or a non-profit, achieves more deterrence—a benefit to class
members that does not require receiving a $5 check first.
Thus, charitable settlements are essential stopgaps to safeguarding
deterrence.180 They optimize deterrence by ensuring the defendants are
exposed to potential litigation for all types of wrongdoing, not just
wrongdoing where damages can be efficiently distributed to individual class
members.181 A requirement that all settlements first distribute funds to
class members, however, runs the risk of under-deterrence.182 Individual
recovery and optimal deterrence are conflicting goals.183 When individual
compensation becomes the primary goal, less optimal deterrence results
because the threat of litigation disappears if charitable settlements are not
allowed. Few lawyers would file claims that have no effective resolution
prospect.184
that optimal deterrence could be reached when there is undistributed money (because the
tortfeasor has already internalized the costs of his tortuous conduct).‖).
178. See, e.g., Diamond Chem. Co., Inc. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., 517 F. Supp. 2d
212, 218 (D.D.C. 2007) (discussing how reversion does not fulfill deterrence goals);
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 (2010) (―One option is to return
the remaining funds to the defendant even when the settlement does not contain a provision
for reversion to the defendant. That option, however, would undermine the deterrence
function of class actions and the underlying substantive-law basis of the recovery by
rewarding the alleged wrongdoer simply because distribution to the class would not be
viable.‖); Boies & Keith, supra note 23, at 269 (―Reversion to the defendant undermines the
deterrent effect of class actions.‖).
179. Cf. Neil K. Gehlawat, Note, Monetary Damages and the (b)(2) Class Action: A
Closer Look at Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1551 (2012) (discussing how
injunctive relief does not provide the same deterrence as monetary damages).
180. See Burch, supra note 173, at 2551 (discussing the harm resulting from minimizing
class actions‘ deterrence potential, given ―the American system‘s heavy reliance on litigation
as ex post regulation‖).
181. See Stephen D. Susman, Prosecuting the Antitrust Class Action, 49 ANTITRUST L.J.
1513, 1515–16 (1980) (―[W]ithout Rule 23 the small claimant [would] be deprived of
effective relief.‖).
182. See, e.g., Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 719 (9th Cir. 2010)
(discussing the underdeterrence risks associated with denying class certification); Genevieve
G. York-Erwin, Note, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action Context, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1800 (2009) (―An economic analysis suggests that without this
collective mechanism, corporations would not fully internalize the costs of their conduct,
causing inefficiencies, undercompensation, underdeterrence, and other social losses.‖).
183. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 109, at 107 (―[T]he introduction of compensationalist
norms into class action policymaking not only is gratuitous, but also undermines the efficacy
of many rules and practices as deterrents.‖); Rosenberg, supra note 166, at 1890 (discussing
the conflict between optimal deterrence and compensation in terms of optimal insurance
theory).
184. The economic reality is that if class counsel cannot expect potential recovery for the
vast time and monetary outlay associated with pursuing a class claim, attorneys simply will
not take the case. See Sofia Adrogué & Hon. Caroline Baker, Litigation in the 21st Century:
The Jury Trial, the Training & the Experts, ADVOC., Fall 2011, at 12; Bartholomew, supra
note 20, at 2149–50 (discussing how increased risks disincentive counsel from pursuing
claims); Melnick, supra note 134, at 776 (discussing how class action attorneys are paid
from settlements, thus making the success of the case relevant to an attorney‘s decision to
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Critics often overlook deterrence gains in challenging charitable
settlements. For example, Public Citizen, a repeat objector to cy pres and
charitable settlements, took issue with the proposed settlement for antitrust
violations in In re Toys “R” Us Antitrust Litigation.185 The settlement
included an earmarked distribution of $36.6 million to Toys for Tots.186
Public Citizen contended the settlement only provided class members
―ephemeral‖ relief.187 The court rejected such a narrow definition of
benefit:
[I]n claiming that the method of distribution means that consumers will
not benefit from the Settlements, [Public Citizen] ignores the deterrent
effect that inheres in the defendants‘ large payout of toys and cash. The
Settlements, with their significant monetary cost to defendants, must be
evaluated not only in terms of their direct value to the public but also in
terms of their deterrent effect on antitrust violators, an effect of value to
consumers.188

Similarly, objectors in In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation189
ignored deterrence gains in attacking an earmarked charitable
distribution.190 There, as described previously,191 the bulk of a $410
million settlement was dispersed to identifiable class members, with a
portion earmarked for distribution to organizations that promote financial
literacy.192 This settlement portion represented the amount allocable to
class members who could not be identified because the defendant‘s older
transaction data was not searchable.193
In rejecting objectors‘ challenges to the settlement, the trial court cited
Professor Fitzpatrick‘s explanation of charitable settlements‘ deterrent
value, which echoed Professor Rubenstein:
In small-stakes cases, the most important function of the class action
device is not compensation of class members but deterrence of
wrongdoing . . . [and] if defendants did not pay someone—even third
parties like cy pres charities—for such harms, then defendants would have
every incentive to cause such harms in the future . . . . Thus, in such
[small-stakes] cases, the most important thing is that the defendant pays
undertake representation). As challenges to charitable distributions mount, the safer course
for class counsel is to diversify the risk by filing other types of cases, rather than invest
limited resources in an uncertain terrain. See Nantiya Ruan & Nancy Reichman, Hours
Equity Is the New Pay Equity, 59 VILL. L. REV. 35, 75 (2014) (discussing how greater
judicial scrutiny means ―fewer private plaintiffs‘ attorneys are willing to risk the high costs
of these cases‖).
185. 191 F.R.D. 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
186. Id. at 349.
187. Id. at 355.
188. Id. at 356.
189. 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
190. Id. at 1354–57.
191. See supra Part I.B.
192. In re Checking Account, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 1355. This case is another example of a
court using the generic term cy pres to discuss a settlement where the charitable distribution
is not limited to a remainder. Hence, the charitable distribution involved in the case is more
accurately described as an earmarked charitable settlement.
193. Id. at 1354.
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for the wrongs it has perpetrated—it is less important who the defendant
pays.194

Stated differently, ―ex ante, the individual would rationally prefer a legal
system that allocates enforcement resources to prevent unreasonable risk
rather than merely to compensate it.‖195 Thus, the more substantiated
position recognizes charitable settlements provide valuable deterrence.
In sum, charitable settlements are well-aligned with class actions‘
regulatory function. They are an equitable distribution method that furthers
individuals‘ ability to vindicate statutory rights and regulate behavior, by
deterring future wrongdoing and disgorging ill-gotten gains. Thus,
theoretical arguments that class actions should be limited to cases where
direct monetary payouts to class members are feasible undermine class
actions‘ larger utility.
C. Collusion and Procedural Concerns Are Unfounded
As detailed above, charitable settlements offer class members valuable
relief by promoting access to justice and deterring wrongdoing by using illgotten gains to effectuate collective goals.
Precluding charitable
settlements would significantly undercut class actions‘ regulatory
enforcement potential.
Nonetheless, challenges to charitable settlements often build on the faulty
premise that such settlements do not benefit class members because they do
not compensate them. Class action objectors commonly repeat two lines of
attack. First, charitable settlements allegedly incentivize class counsel and
defendants to ―sell out‖ class members. From there, some critics assert
such settlements entice counsel to forego vigorously advocating on behalf
of class members—thus raising due process concerns.196 The remainder of
this part focuses on the flaws in these derivative arguments, refuting the
remaining theoretical obstacles to judicial approval of charitable
settlements.
1. Collusion Fears Are Overblown
Critics still hold onto a narrow definition of benefit by arguing charitable
settlements incentivize class counsel to ―sell out‖ the class.197 This attack
recycles an oft-asserted criticism of small-sum class actions: class

194. Id. at 1355 n.24 (citing Supp. Decl. of Prof. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, ¶¶ 6, 9).
195. David L. Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass
Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 840 (2002).
196. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief, supra note 17, at 650–51.
197. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1373–74 (1995); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen,
Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1112 (1996); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Susan
P. Koniak, Rule of Law: The Latest Class Action Scam, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1995, at 11
(―Paying the class‘s lawyers to sell out their clients is invariably cheaper for defendants than
paying the class.‖).

3270

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

attorneys receive millions while class members receive little or nothing.198
Assuming a charitable settlement is by definition ―selling out,‖ any such
settlement is circumstantial evidence of collusion between class counsel and
defendants. Some further claim charitable settlements are ―cheaper‖ for
defendants because they avoid payouts to individual class members.199
Such collusion concerns in the charitable settlement context are more
perception than reality. While class actions potentially can create conflicts
of interest, this does not justify assuming charitable settlements are
collusive. A charitable settlement can represent the full, fair value of the
class‘ claims, especially when administrative costs exceed individual
compensation.200 Safeguards already exist to prevent the collusive behavior
feared by critics.
First, the process for negotiating attorneys‘ fees is the same regardless of
the settlement structure. Though no express prohibition against concurrent
fee and settlement negotiations exists, in many class actions, the attorneys‘
fees discussions are deferred until after all settlement terms are fully
negotiated.201 There is no guarantee defendants will agree to generous class
counsel compensation when the settlement includes a charitable
distribution. Such settlements are often also overseen by mediators, further
offsetting potential collusion concerns.202

198. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 371–72 (2000)
(―[W]here the plaintiffs‘ attorney was once seen as a public-regarding private attorney
general, increasingly the more standard depiction is as a profit-seeking entrepreneur, capable
of opportunistic actions and often willing to subordinate the interests of class members to the
attorney‘s own economic self-interest.‖); Bruce L. Hay, The Theory of Fee Regulation in
Class Action Settlements, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1429, 1433 (1997); Bruce Hay & David
Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and
Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1390 (2000).
199. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, When Lawyers Cut Their Clients Out of the Deal, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/us/supreme-court-may-hearnovel-class-action-case.html?_r=0 (quoting objectors‘ counsel to Facebook settlement).
200. See, e.g., Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2011) (describing
charitable settlement ―[i]n lieu of a cost-prohibitive distribution to the plaintiff class‖ where
defendants‘ maximum liability per person would be roughly three cents).
201. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 295 F.R.D. 112, 138 (E.D.
La. 2013) (―[T]he Parties did not begin to negotiate fees until they had already delivered an
otherwise complete settlement agreement to the Court.‖); In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig.,
No. 11 C 8176, 2013 WL 4510197, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2013) (―It is undisputed that
there was no negotiation regarding attorney‘s fees until after the parties had reached
agreement on settlement of the class members‘ claims.‖); In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales
Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 335 (3d Cir. 1998) (―There is no indication the
parties began to negotiate attorneys‘ fees until after they had finished negotiating the
settlement agreement.‖); Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 233 (D.N.J.
2005) (―[T]he parties did not commence negotiations on the amount of attorneys‘ fees and
expenses that MassMutual would agree to pay until all material terms of the Settlement had
been agreed upon, about one year after settlement negotiations began.‖).
202. See, e.g., In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1054 (S.D. Cal.
2013) (―There were numerous settlement proceedings, several of which were presided over
by well-respected retired district court judges and magistrate judges. By all accounts, the
settlement resulted from an arms-length negotiation process with the benefit of the class
members in mind.‖).
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Second, courts explicitly evaluate whether the settlement is the product
of collusion.203 This requirement is hardly pro forma. The district judge
acts as a fiduciary of the class; if a trial judge fails in executing his duty,
circuit courts will reverse the decision.204
Courts have approved
settlements and still cut requests for attorney fees, which also minimizes
risks of selling out the class.205
Moreover, the approval process is particularly arduous for charitable
settlements, which already receive heightened scrutiny. 206 Objectors in
such cases are commonplace, causing courts to provide more exhaustive
review given the very likely appeal stemming from any settlement
approval.207 At the same time, defendants have reason to only promote
class settlements that satisfy the Rule 23 settlement approval process. A
collusive settlement creates problems with the class‘s adequacy of
representation—negating the validity of the settlement.208 The resources
defendants spent reaching an agreeable settlement, litigating the
settlement‘s preliminary approval, and negotiating the settlement notice
would be for naught if ultimately disapproved by the court.
Third, collusion assumes agreement between class and defendants‘
counsel, at the expense of class members; it takes two to collude.209 While
defendants are motivated to provide the smallest settlement possible,210 the
amount defendants pay is the same whether it is a monetary distribution or a
203. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat‘l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002); Joel
A. v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2000); In re Cell Phone Terminations Fee Cases,
180 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1118 (2010).
204. See, e.g., Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2002); In re
Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 823
F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1987); Stewart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 756 F.2d 1285, 1293 (7th Cir.
1985).
205. See, e.g., Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 737 (1986) (upholding district court‘s
decision to waive attorney‘s fees completely); Cobell v. Norton, 407 F. Supp. 2d 140, 177
(D.D.C. 2005); Garabedian v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 123, 127 (2004).
206. See, e.g., In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir.
2011) (listing ―warning signs‖ to consider in evaluating class action settlements); Mirfasihi
v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 450 F.3d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 2006) (same); see also Foer, supra note
95, at 88 (―The cy pres remedy today is coming under closer public and legal scrutiny than at
any previous time.‖).
207. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 835 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (overruling objectors‘ challenges after lengthy examination); In re
Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1335–36 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (same).
208. See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Defendant‟s Obligation to Ensure Adequate
Representation in Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 511, 539 (2006) (discussing how the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 41 applies to both defendants and plaintiffs).
Professor Bassett goes on to explain why defendants, thus, have an interest in ensuring
adequate representation: ―[T]he Restatement gives a defendant no place to hide when the
defendant knew that the class members were not accorded adequacy of representation—
under such circumstances, the judgment is not binding on the inadequately represented class
members.‖ Id.
209. See Brian W. Warwick, Class Action Settlement Collusion: Let‟s Not Sue Class
Counsel Quite Yet . . . ., 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 605, 611 (1999).
210. See Jacob Kreutzer, The Difficulties of Encouraging Cooperation in a Zero-Sum
Game, 65 ME. L. REV. 147, 159 (2012) (describing ―the settlement range [as] the range from
the smallest offer the plaintiff should accept and the largest offer the defendant should
make‖).
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charitable settlement. While charitable settlements minimize administrative
costs possibly paid by defendants, defendants still fund the settlement, pay
for notice, and pay attorneys‘ fees.211
Fourth, fears of defendants pushing for charitable settlements over
monetary distributions are overblown because not all Rule 23(b)(3) cases
qualify for charitable settlements. Such settlements are the exception to the
rule.212 They are limited to cases with distribution problems.213 While the
guidelines for the trigger test can be shored up, as discussed in Part III, even
as presently applied, this requirement significantly restrains such
settlements‘ growth.
Finally, collusion is less likely with charitable settlements than with
alternative, nonmonetary distribution options like reverters. Charitable
settlements still financially motivate class counsel to push for a high
distribution. As the settlement amount rises, so does class counsel‘s
payday, which is based on the value of the settlement.214 At the same time,
defendants will try to limit the settlement amount. This is unlike reversion
provision settlements, where undistributed funds return to the defendants‘
coffers. Reverters incentivize the parties to falsely inflate settlement fund
values for judicial approval. Such provisions ―decouple‖215 class counsel‘s
incentive to maximize the settlement amount and its corresponding
deterrent and disgorgement impact.216 Hence, charitable settlements
actually minimize collusion concerns as compared to other forms of class
action settlement.
On the whole, accusations of collusion are almost routine in challenging
charitable settlements. Yet fears of ―selling out‖ class members to receive a
generous payday have not necessarily materialized into realistic concerns.
At the least, objectors and critics should face the burden of coming up with
actual proof of collusion before removing this valuable distribution option
from the judicial arsenal.

211. Cf. Warwick, supra note 209, at 611 (―[F]or collusion to influence the settlement of
a class action, the defendant must also be willing to actively participate.‖).
212. Thus, in settled class actions, particularly for antitrust and securities claims, ―the
great bulk of the money received from the defendants actually is distributed to class
members.‖ Miller, supra note 124, at 667.
213. See supra Part I.B (discussing the ―trigger‖ requirement for charitable settlements).
214. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
215. Int‘l Precious Metals Corp. v. Waters, 530 U.S. 1223 (2000) (statement of
O‘Connor, J., respecting the denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari).
216. Such a falsely inflated settlement value was rejected by the District Court of Maine
in Sylvester v. CIGNA Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Me. 2005). The settlement was
presented as a $3.4 million opt-in fund but included a reverter. Id. at 38. As a result of the
reverter, class members received $449,159.81 while the defendants would have received
$1,644,601.94. Id. at 47. Recognizing such a settlement structure would provide ―real
value‖ to defendants and class counsel but provide little deterrent impact, the Court denied
the settlement as unfair. Id. at 53.
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2. Charitable Distributions Do Not Create Procedural Problems
Beyond collusion, some contend charitable settlements violate
substantive due process217 by improperly expanding class members‘
substantive rights and foregoing proof of individual damages.218 This
critique focuses on the Rules Enabling Act, which defines the scope of
procedural rules the judicial branch may adopt.219 Since charitable
distributions would not occur in individual litigation, allowing them in class
actions supposedly makes them more like improper civil fines than true
damages.220 However, this position advances an overly narrow definition
of the Rules Enabling Act and fails to acknowledge that charitable
settlements do not alter individualized damage calculations.221
First, Rules Enabling Act arguments face a high bar; the Supreme Court
has rejected virtually all such arguments.222 This is not surprising given
judicial authority is generously defined to include ―the ability to adopt
procedural rules that impact the future conduct of lawyers and parties in
judicial proceedings.‖223 In a recent opinion, Justice Scalia confirmed this
217. Some critics of charitable settlements also claim failing to provide class members
monetary distributions raises procedural due process problems. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief,
supra note 17, at 650 (―[U]se of cy pres relief in class actions also gives rise to fatal
violations of procedural due process.‖). These challenges are easily dismissed. Procedural
due process does not create a mandate for monetary distributions. Rather, it simply requires
class members ―receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the
litigation.‖ Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). A charitable
settlement should satisfy procedural due process so long as class members can opt-out and
the settlement notice spells out who receives the charitable settlement and for what purpose.
See In re Vitamin Cases, 107 Cal. App. 4th 820, 829 (2003) (―The requirements of due
process [are] met when, as in this case, the notice explain[s] that the proposed settlement
provides solely for the distribution of funds to nonprofit organizations and foundations,
states that there will be no payments to individual [California] consumers, and informs the
class members of their options of opting out or objecting.‖).
218. See, e.g., Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief, supra note 17, at 646.
219. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) (2012) (providing that the ―Supreme Court shall have the
power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in
the United States district courts[,] . . . [and] [s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right‖). As Justice Brandeis stated: ―Congress has no power to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or
‗general,‘ be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.‖ Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
220. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief, supra note 17, at 646; cf. Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am.,
Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 481 (5th Cir. 2011).
221. See Donald L. Doernberg, “The Tempest”: Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates,
P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.: The Rules Enabling Act Decision That Added to the
Confusion—But Should Not Have, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1147, 1183 (2011) (discussing
arguments that the Rules Enabling Act uses a narrow definition no court has ever adopted);
see also Tidmarsh, supra note 17, at 571 (discussing how arguments against class actions
rooted in the Rules Enabling Act run contrary to the Act‘s current interpretation); ADVISORY
COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 22, at 266 n.36 (explaining that cy pres settlements do
―not invent[] a new ‗remedy‘ to be used in litigated actions‖).
222. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407
(2010) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
223. John H. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judicial Procedure Are Void
Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928). For a more thorough discussion of the Rules
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broad judicial power, noting how courts can design ―[a] judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.‖224
The Rules Enabling Act does not prohibit federal judges from fashioning
―procedural devices.‖225 Judges‘ equitable discretion over how to distribute
settlement funds is well within the judiciary‘s procedure-making power.
Such discretion falls within the ―justly administering remedy and redress‖
language—approving a charitable settlement is administering a remedy.226
Moreover, charitable settlements do not ―add, subtract, or define any of the
elements necessary‖227 but rather distribute damages already properly
defined under the substantive laws at issue.
Approving charitable settlement distributions under Rule 23 is analogous
to other procedural rules that do not violate the Rules Enabling Act. For
example, McCalla v. Royal MacCabees Life Insurance Co.228 evaluated a
Nevada law governing when a litigant may make a motion for prejudgment
interest.229 The Ninth Circuit held Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),
not Nevada law, controlled the timing of prejudgment interests—even
though it would result in an overall larger amount paid out.230 The court
explained the Rule defines ―when and how‖ interest can be reviewed.231
Consequently, it did not violate the Rules Enabling Act ―because its
application affects only the process of enforcing litigants‘ rights and not the
rights themselves.‖232 Similarly, charitable settlements are concerned with
―when and how‖ damages are distributed, not how damages are quantified,
which is properly left to the requirements of the underlying claim.233 Thus,
Enabling Act in the context of class actions, see Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch,
The Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort
Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 475 (1997).
224. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14).
225. See id. at 420. Further, there is no true conflict between the substantive claims and
the procedural requirements; thus, unlike many Rules Enabling Act arguments, there are not
concerns of conflicting federal procedural requirements and state laws. Cf. id. at 400–01
(comparing New York state law prohibiting certain class actions with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23).
The underlying state claims now being heard in federal court post-CAFA are primarily silent
on questions of charitable distributions. Hence, without an express conflict, there are also no
overlapping Rules Enabling Act/Erie-type problems.
226. But cf. Boies & Keith, supra note 23, at 274 (discussing why Rules Enabling Act
attacks on charitable distributions are unfounded).
227. McCalla v. Royal MacCabees Life Ins. Co., 369 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2004).
228. 69 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2004).
229. Id. at 1135.
230. Id. at 1136.
231. Id. at 1135 (quoting Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 762 (9th Cir.
2003)).
232. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
233. See Boies & Keith, supra note 23, at 274.
There are broader problems with the Rules Enabling Act attack. Even ardent
opponents of class action cy pres awards concede that, rather than transforming
underlying substantive law claims into a civil fine, the disposition of unclaimed
property is a ―legal issue wholly distinct from the substantive law enforced in the
suit that [gives] rise to the unclaimed award in the first place.‖
Id. (quoting Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief, supra note 17). In this way, charitable settlements
can be construed as analogous to ancillary relief, like administrative agencies that utilize
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charitable settlements should not be seen as a violation of the Rules
Enabling Act.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Rules Enabling Act argument
stems from the nomenclature problems that have long since plagued
charitable distributions. Not only have cy pres distributions and charitable
distributions been conflated, some courts also blur fluid recovery and
charitable settlements234—adding mud to already murky waters. Fluid
recovery is a broad concept that covers both damage calculation and
disbursement. It has three steps. The class (1) aggregates a damage
calculation for purposes of certification; (2) uses a summary claim
procedure; and (3) distributes claims to indirectly benefit class members.235
The distribution can come in multiple forms, including price rollbacks,
coupons, and charitable payouts.236
The first step of fluid recovery, aggregating damages, potentially triggers
Rules Enabling Act issues.237 A quick example highlights this problem.
Assume class member A‘s and class member B‘s damages were $2 and $6
respectively; using fluid recovery would generate aggregate damages of $8,
meaning $4 per member. Accordingly, under fluid recovery, critics argue
that class member A would be overcompensated at the expense of class
member B, thus altering ―defendants‘ substantive right to pay damages
reflective of their actual liability.‖238 Consequently, some jurisdictions
reject the first step of fluid recovery239 or, at a minimum, greatly constrict
its application.240
ancillary remedies. While these remedies are not expressly authorized by statutes,
administrative agencies can seek ancillary remedies to justly administer remedy and redress.
George W. Dent, Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Remedies,
67 MINN. L. REV. 865 (1983). For instance, like ancillary remedies, charitable settlements
deter future violations, help preserve the status quo, and most importantly, benefit social
good aimed at fighting violations. This analogy further supports the argument that charitable
settlements are procedural rather than substantive and do not disrupt the Rules Enabling Act.
234. See, e.g., CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D
§ 1784 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2014).
235. See, e.g., California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 472–73 (1986); JEROLD
S. SOLOVY ET AL., Class Action Controversies, in CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL
PRACTICE (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 499, 1994).
236. See, e.g., Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1305
(9th Cir. 1990); In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 614, 620
(W.D. Wash. 2003).
237. See 2 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 53, § 8:16 (―Calculating damages in the aggregate
cannot be squared with the Rules Enabling Act where class members‘ alleged damages can
be reliably quantified only through individualized proof.‖).
238. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231–32 (2d Cir. 2008).
239. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1008 (2d Cir. 1973) (rejecting fluid
recovery); see also Dumas v. Albers Med., Inc., No. 03-0640-CV-W-GAF, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33482, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 7, 2005) (stating fluid recovery ―is not appropriate
when it is used to assess the damages of the class without proof of damages suffered by
individual class members‖ and class action was otherwise unmanageable); City of
Philadelphia v. Am. Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 72 (D.N.J. 1971). While courts have followed
Eisen, the case‘s arguments on fluid recovery have been hotly criticized. See, e.g., Managing
the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARV. L. REV. 426, 453 (1973).
240. For example, in the Ninth Circuit fluid recovery is allowed when ―conventional
methods of proof are demonstrably unavailable.‖ Guiterrez v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 07-
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However, charitable settlements are distinct from fluid recovery in a
simple but important way. They impact disbursement, not damage
calculations.241 Rule 23 requirements are not altered by a charitable
settlement. The class is still obligated to show common issues predominate
for purposes of certification.242 As a result, the distribution method does
not impact defendants‘ obligation to pay a settlement reflective of their
actual liability. Rather, as the Third Circuit explains, ―a district court‘s
certification of a settlement simply recognizes the parties‘ deliberate
decision to bind themselves . . . without engaging in any substantive
adjudication of the underlying causes of action.‖243 Hence, arguments that
class members cannot show they have suffered damages are red herrings.
Since charitable distributions benefit class members without raising
substantiated concerns regarding collusion or due process, no theoretical
legal barriers to approving such settlements exist. Given their ability to
advance the goals of the underlying substantive claims,244 charitable
settlements are a necessary distribution method for class actions. That said,
there are still ways to refine such settlements to provide clearer contours for
their application. These refinements are described in Part III.
III. PROTECTING CHARITABLE SETTLEMENTS THROUGH CLEARER
GUIDELINES
Despite the foregoing, some courts reject charitable settlements outright
or discourage them by denying accompanying attorneys‘ fee
applications.245 While the majority of trial courts have demonstrated a
willingness to approve charitable settlements, even these decisions are laden

05923 WHA, 2009 WL 1247040, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2009); cf. Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782–86 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing statistical sampling for class
damages because of the ―extraordinarily unusual nature of the case‖).
241. See, e.g., Nat‘l Ass‘n of Consumer Advocates, Standards & Guidelines for
Litigating & Settling Consumer Class Actions, 176 F.R.D. 375, 391 (1997) (―Those issues
are very different from the question of cy pres distribution of unclaimed funds, an issue
which does not subject defendants to greater liability or alter their substantive rights.‖).
242. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (setting forth predominance requirements for monetary
class actions).
243. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 173 n.8 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting
Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 312 (3d Cir. 2011)).
244. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (explaining that ―[p]rivate
enforcement . . . provides a necessary supplement‖ to public enforcement); George D.
Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The „Salvage‟ Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 658, 663 (1956) (―Every successful suit duly rewarded encourages other suits to redress
misconduct and by the same token discourages misconduct which would occasion suit.‖);
Salil K. Mehra, Deterrence: The Private Remedy and International Antitrust Cases, 40
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 275, 280 (2002) (―U.S. [antitrust] law has adopted rules that favor
the aim of deterring wrongful conduct over the aim of providing recovery.‖); Fred O.
Williams, Adelphia Faces 22 Shareholder Lawsuits, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 28, 2002, at B13
(―The SEC is overwhelmed . . . nothing would be done except for class-action lawyers.‖).
245. See, e.g., In re Dep‘t of Veterans Affairs (VA) Data Theft Litig., 653 F. Supp. 2d
58, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reducing fee request); Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., No. C11-1726 RS,
2012 WL 5838198, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2012) (discussing how attorneys‘ fee requests
in a charitable settlement raises ―serious concerns‖).
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with inconsistent standards. This inconsistency—coupled with Justice
Roberts‘s call to arms—has emboldened objectors.246
Objectors pose a particular problem for charitable settlements. Objector
allegations of collusion or unsubstantiated claims that such settlements are
inferior to monetary distributions have slowed the settlement approval
process and generated unnecessary fees and expenses while wasting judicial
resources.247 In refuting objections to a recent earmarked charitable
settlement, Judge Gertner noted:
[P]rofessional objectors can levy what is effectively a tax on class action
settlements, a tax that has no benefit to anyone other than to the objectors.
Literally nothing is gained from the cost: Settlements are not restructured
and the class, on whose benefit the appeal is purportedly raised, gains
nothing.248

Rather than endlessly relitigating whether the charitable settlement
concept is appropriate, settlement approval should instead focus on the
particular proposed distribution. To assist in this evaluation, this part offers
clearer standards for ensuring charitable settlements achieve their fullest
regulatory utility. These proposals focus on three aspects of a charitable
settlement: (1) the trigger for such a settlement; (2) evaluating the proposed
recipient; and (3) computing attorneys‘ fees.
Once a charitable settlement and accompanying fee petition meet these
guidelines, objections should be limited to a pay-to-play basis. Objectors
should be responsible for attorneys‘ fees and costs generated responding to
meritless objections. This ensures the settlement approval process does not
devolve into unwarranted lengthy satellite litigation.249
246. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Netflix
Privacy Litig., No. 5:11-CV-00379 EJD, 2013 WL 1120801, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18,
2013); In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
247. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1336–37
(S.D. Fla. 2011) (rejecting objectors‘ lengthy challenges to the reasonableness of the
settlement, the amount of the settlement, settlement notice, the scope‘s release, fee petition,
and charitable distributions ―find[ing] that they are both completely unsupported in the
record (no Objector having submitted even a single affidavit to provide facts or expert
opinions supporting their positions) and unpersuasive as to the substance of their
complaints‖).
248. See id. at 1361 n.30 (quoting Barnes v. Fleet Bos. Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395-NG,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *3–4 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2006)); see also In re
UnitedHealth Group Inc. PSLRA Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1108–09 (D. Minn. 2009);
O‘Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 214 F.R.D. 266, 295 n.26 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Snell v.
Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. Civ. 97-2784 (RLE), 2000 WL 1336640, at *9 (D.
Minn. Sept. 8, 2000); Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 975 (E.D.
Tex. 2000).
249. The torrid procedural history of Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp. is a telling
example of how objections to charitable settlements can exhaust valuable judicial resources
without generating gain. 450 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 2006). There, plaintiffs alleged the
defendant improperly sold mortgage information to third-party companies, which then
marketed financial products to two sub-classes of mortgagers. Id. at 746–47. The parties
eventually negotiated a settlement totaling $2.4 million, whereby one class would receive
monetary compensation and the other class‘s relief was an earmarked charitable distribution.
Id. at 747. If distributed to the entire class, the settlement would have amounted to 17 cents
per class member. Id. The trial court approved the settlement‘s fairness, but objectors
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A. Clearer Trigger for Impracticability
First, recognizing charitable settlements as the exception rather than the
rule raises the question, at what point should the exception apply? Stated
differently, what is the ―trigger‖ requirement for a charitable settlement?
Clearer, more consistent standards are needed to identify cases where
charitable settlements are appropriate.250 Net-zero cases, where the
administrative costs exhaust the settlement, should regularly trigger
charitable distributions.251 Yet as mentioned in Part I, objectors routinely
challenge such settlements for not distributing funds to class members
first.252
Currently, courts import the cy pres standard for all types of charitable
distributions, defining the trigger as the point at which a monetary
distribution becomes ―unlawful, impossible, or impracticable.‖253 Since, as
previously discussed,254 charitable distributions are distinguishable from cy
pres, importing definitions from the trust context is illogical, but more
importantly, provides little concrete guidance. Even in the trust context,
there is ―significant variance in the degree of impossibility or
impracticability required‖ to trigger cy pres.255 In fact, commentators do
not even agree on whether the cy pres doctrine is expanding or
narrowing.256
How the terms are used outside the cy pres context is equally unhelpful.
For example, in contract law, the doctrine of ―impracticability‖ requires an
unforeseen supervening circumstance not within the contemplation of the
appealed not once but three times. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 551 F.3d 682, 685 (7th
Cir. 2008); Mirfasihi, 450 F.3d at 746; Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 782
(7th Cir. 2004). Ultimately, six years after the settlement agreement, in a third opinion, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the charitable distribution, finding it fair and adequate given the
significant risks associated with successful prosecution of the underlying claims. Mirfasihi,
551 F.3d at 685.
250. Compare McLaughlin, supra note 60, at 465–77 (discussing how clarifying the
trigger for when a conservation easement is ―impossible or impracticable‖ would ―yield
more predictable results‖).
251. See, e.g., In re Netflix Privacy, 2013 WL 1120801, at *6.
252. Id. at *2. For example, in the In re Netflix Privacy settlement, the trial court granted
preliminary approval of a $9 million wholly charitable settlement stemming from claims that
Netflix unlawfully retained and disclosed private customer information. The class
constituted approximately 62 million claimants. See id. at *1. Thus, the parties argued any
distribution of the settlement fund would be de minimis, at best. See id. at *7. Nonetheless,
objectors challenged the settlement, arguing instead that the settlement should provide
individual compensation. See id. at *11. Although the court overruled the objections,
explaining that no other realistic settlement distribution option existed, objectors forced the
court to spend time and money responding to their meritless challenge. See id. at *12.
253. See Restatement (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003).
254. See supra Part I.A (distinguishing cy pres, earmarked charitable settlements, and
wholly charitable settlements).
255. McLaughlin, supra note 60, at 465–67 (―Decisions regarding whether the charitable
purpose of a gift or trust has become ‗impossible or impracticable‘ are based on the
particular facts of each case, and no precise definition of the standard exists.‖).
256. Id. at 467 (―Although some commentators have noted a ‗prevailing conservative
mood‘ in the approach of the courts to this first step in the cy pres process, others have noted
that the trend in the case law has been to broaden the circumstances in which cy pres can be
applied.‖).
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parties at the time of the contract.257 This definition is not a workable
trigger for charitable distributions because it is known in advance that
circumstances will make a distribution to the class members impracticable.
The remaining trigger terms, ―impossible,‖ ―inefficient,‖ and ―wasteful,‖
are also plagued by vague, inconsistent definitions.258
The lack of an easily transferable, preexisting trigger point for charitable
settlements highlights the need for more clarity.259 To address this need,
this Article proposes the following straightforward inequality:260
2(A)>C
―A‖ represents the average cost per class member to administer the
settlement fund. This variable is appropriate because it changes depending
on the facts of the case, thus reflecting potential distribution problems. If
class members are transient or difficult to locate, administrative costs rise.
In contrast, clear records facilitating the location of class members lower
costs. Multiplying A by two ensures administrative costs are justified when
compared to the potential monetary gain of consumers.261 ―C‖ is the
approximate individual consumer distribution. If the settlement is tiered,
meaning some class members are eligible for a different distribution
amount, the formula should apply per tier. Consequently, some tiers may
trigger a potential charitable settlement while others do not.262 Assuming
257. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 1 (2013).
258. See, e.g., JoEllen Lind, The End of Trial on Damages? Intangible Losses and
Comparability Review, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 251, 315 (2003) (discussing ―competing definitions
of efficiency‖); William V. Roth, Jr., The “Malmanagement” Problem: Finding the Roots
of Government Waste, Fraud, and Abuse, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 961, 964 (1983) (noting
―no definition of waste fits everyone‘s notion of what constitutes wasteful activity‖); Karen
A. Russell, Wasting Water in the Northwest: Eliminating Waste As a Way of Restoring
Streamflows, 27 ENVTL. L. 151, 163 (1997) (discussing ―the lack of a clear definition of
waste‖).
259. In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 991 F. Supp. 1193, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (―[T]here is
an appealing symmetry to the proposition that the cost of the distribution should not be
greater than the amount of the distribution itself.‖).
260. This formula stems from Judge Walker‘s decision in In re Wells Fargo Securities
Litigation. Id. The case involved remainder, which could be distributed as a second
distribution or as cy pres. In approving a cy pres distribution, Judge Walker compared
administrative cost versus individual distribution, permitting a distribution so long as the
individual distribution is double the administrative cost. See id. at 1197–98. Professor Brian
Fitzpatrick offers an alternative proposal, whereby class counsel receive all settlement
distributions in cases involving $100 or less in individual compensation. See Fitzpatrick,
supra note 23, at 2067–71. His argument has some allure from a deterrence-insurance
perspective. Moreover, the Rule 23 Subcommittee‘s recent draft proposed amendments to
Rule 23(e), which incorporated the $100 threshold. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES,
supra note 22, at 264–71. But by Professor Fitzpatrick‘s own admission, ―It goes without
saying that it would be politically difficult for judges to award fees equal to 100% of smallstakes class judgments even if they had the legal authority to do so.‖ Fitzpatrick, supra note
23, at 2075. Thus, this Article‘s proposed inequality triggers a more pragmatic proposal.
261. Accord In re Wells Fargo, 991 F. Supp. at 1197 (―The court could simply direct
class counsel to pay all claimants who are entitled to more than $5.50 from the
residue . . . [but] the claims administrator would spend $5.50 to send Mr. Casagrande a
check for fifty-two cents. . . . [Therefore] the line must be set at a higher point than $5.50.‖).
262. Different tiers of distribution are fairly common in class action settlements, even for
cases that do not include sub-classes. See, e.g., Pelletz v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 255 F.R.D. 537,
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the settlement otherwise satisfies Rule 23(e), if 2(A) is greater than C, a
rebuttable presumption exists supporting a charitable distribution.263
For example, take a hypothetical settlement of $250,000 for a class of
30,000 consumers, with an estimated administrative cost of $100,000,
roughly $3.34 per class member. Assume administrative costs come from
the total settlement fund, leaving $150,000 for distribution. Class members
would then receive $5 at an administrative expense of $3.34, creating an
inequality of 6.68 > 5—triggering a charitable settlement.
This formula is a fair trigger point for three reasons. First, it is consistent
with a generic definition of efficiency as a system that ―exhibit[s] a high
ratio of output to input.‖264 The administrative costs reflect the input while
the individual compensation is the output. Multiplying the administrative
costs by two ensures the input-to-output ratio is not just marginally greater.
It reflects individual distributions where the administrative costs involved
are not justified given the negligible monetary gain to consumers.
Second, this formula is consistent with one definition of ―wasteful‖ as
meaning a mechanism that is more expensive than an equally beneficial
alternative.265 The two relevant alternatives are monetary distributions and
charitable distributions. The quality of a particular charity can be assessed
by its administrative cost ratio, specifically, how much is used for
administrative overhead versus how many cents per dollar are used to
advance the charity‘s work.266 For better charities, the ratio is roughly
2:1—meaning approximately 66 cents per dollar are distributed, while 33
cents are used on overhead.267
Building on this, individual distributions in cases that do not satisfy the
proposed formula are wasteful compared to a wholly charitable distribution.
Take, for example, a $12 settlement where the administrative cost is $6 per
consumer and each consumer would only receive $6. Such a settlement
539 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (involving multitiered settlement in a consumer class action); In re
Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. MISC. 99-197 (TFH) MDL 1285, 2001 WL 34312839, at *1
(D.D.C. July 16, 2001) (discussing settlement involving four separate settlement funds for
different types of claimants); In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 186 F.R.D. 403, 416
(S.D. Tex. 1999) (discussing multiple claimant tiers in antitrust class action settlement).
263. The standard for settlement approval goes beyond whether a charitable settlement is
appropriate and considers the overall fairness of the settlement. See supra Part I.A (detailing
the settlement approval process).
264. Paul L. Tractenberg, Beyond Educational Adequacy: Looking Backward and
Forward Through the Lens of New Jersey, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 411, 426 (2008) (looking
at efficiency in the context of education reform). This definition is probably closest to
allocative efficiency. See, e.g., Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust, Ideology, and
the Arabesques of Economic Theory, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 284 (1995) (―Productive
efficiency means the effective use of resources by individual firms.‖).
265. See Paul E. Kalb, Controlling Health Care Costs by Controlling Technology: A
Private Contractual Approach, 99 YALE L.J. 1109, 1113 n.18 (1990) (―In economic terms, a
wasteful technology is one whose costs outweigh its benefits or one that is more expensive
than an equally beneficial alternative.‖).
266. See, e.g., Roy Lewis, Check Out Your Charity, MOTLEY FOOL (July 18, 2003)
(detailing criteria for ―efficient and effective‖ charities), available at http://www.fool.com/
personal-finance/taxes/2003/07/18/check-out-your-charity.aspx.
267. See id.
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does not satisfy the proposed formula—nor should it. If given to an
adequate charity, 66 percent of the $12 is used for collective good, meaning
roughly $9 rather than $6. Thus, the charitable distribution is a cheaper
alternative that provides the class equal deterrence and access to justice.
Third, this formula minimizes the potential waste from limiting
charitable distributions to cy pres remainders. In class actions where claims
rates are low, the leftover funds are usually distributed as cy pres
remainders, but the cy pres amounts are diminished by administrative costs
that could have been minimized by using a charitable distribution from the
outset.268 Pearson v. NBTY, Inc.269 provides an example of how charitable
settlements could prevent waste. There, the parties reached a $14.2 million
settlement in a pending consumer class action against Target.270 After class
notice and completion of the claim process, only $865,284 of the settlement
fund was distributed to class members, while notice costs were twice as
much as actual class payouts.271 Rather than spending over $1.5 million in
claims administration, a larger portion of the settlement could have gone
directly to a charitable distribution.272
Admittedly, this formula may be criticized for being too generous or not
generous enough. Some may squabble that A should actually be 3(A) or
.5(A)—and such critiques may have merit depending on the case. However,
this test provides a brighter line273 to assess potential charitable settlements,
while simultaneously maintaining the flexibility courts need to fulfill their
equitable function in evaluating settlements.274 By coupling this formula
with a rebuttable presumption, courts can consider the facts of a particular

268. See, e.g., Diamond Chem. Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., 517 F. Supp. 2d 212,
214–15 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (distributing approximately half the settlement to a charity after
individual distributions were made).
269. No. 11 CV 7972, 2014 WL 30676, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2014).
270. See id.
271. See id. at *4.
272. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 189–99 (1987)
(explaining that individuals are indifferent about a potential loss that is minimal in relation to
his income); Fitzpatrick, supra note 23, at 2067 (―[A] loss of a few or a few hundred dollars
does not appreciably affect the marginal utility an individual derives from additional
wealth.‖).
273. See, e.g., Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 145 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing
the ―logic and appeal‖ of bright-line rules); Midwest Imports, Ltd. v. Coval, 71 F.3d 1311,
1316 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing how bright-line rules are ―essential to obtaining compliance
with the rule and to ensuring that long-run aggregate benefits in efficiency inure to district
courts‖); cf. Kevin C. Mcmunigal & Calvin William Sharpe, Reforming Extrinsic
Impeachment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 363, 375 (2001) (―One advantage a bright line rule
generally has over a case-by-case rule is the comparative cost of administering the rule—the
time and other resources judges and parties would expend weighing the benefits and costs of
extrinsic evidence under a case-by-case rule. A bright line rule is superior on this ground to
a case-by-case rule precisely because of its simplicity.‖).
274. See, e.g., Fermin v. Moriarty, No. 96 CIV. 3022 (MBM), 2003 WL 21787351, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2003) (discussing how rebuttal presumptions provide flexibility); see also,
e.g., Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Ass‘n v. Econ. Regulatory Admin., 822 F.2d
1105, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same).
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case in evaluating the adequacy of a given charitable settlement.275
Consequently, adopting this trigger would ensure small-stakes claims, or
cases with other distribution challenges, do not generate unnecessarily
protracted objections during the settlement approval process.
B. Clearer Nexus Requirement
In addition to trigger requirement challenges, objectors often contest the
proposed recipient in charitable settlements. In making this objection, the
assault is more destructive than constructive; alternative recipients are
rarely proposed.276 For settlement approval, the test should not be whether
the proposed recipient is the best possible option,277 as this undermines the
settlement negotiation process‘s integrity and invites subjectivity.278
Instead, this section clarifies the standard for determining whether a
particular organization is the appropriate recipient of a charitable
settlement.
To begin, the parties, not the court, should select recipients. This
minimizes judicial favoritism and potential conflict of interest
challenges.279 As Judge Kleinfeld noted, ―The rules of judicial ethics have
in many forms for over a hundred years prohibited judges from endorsing
charities, because of the risk that lawyers and litigants will feel compelled
to contribute to them.‖280 Mostly, this proposal is already in effect for
charitable settlements.281 Unlike cy pres remainders, which are not always
275. See generally Joel S. Hjelmaas, Stepping Back from the Thicket: A Proposal for the
Treatment of Rebuttable Presumptions and Inferences, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 427, 433 (1993)
(describing the differences between a rebuttal presumption and an inference).
276. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (challenging proposed charitable settlement recipient); Nachshin v. AOL,
LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1037–38 (9th Cir. 2011) (challenging charitable distribution by
contending ―the charities selected by the parties do not relate to the issue in the case and are
not geographically diverse‖); In re Mex. Money Transfer Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1031
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (―The California Objectors argue that the cy pres provisions are not
‗narrowly tailored.‘‖).
277. Lane, 696 F.3d at 820–21 (―We do not require as part of that doctrine that settling
parties select a cy pres recipient that the court or class members would find ideal. On the
contrary, such an intrusion into the private parties‘ negotiations would be improper and
disruptive to the settlement process.‖).
278. See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172–74 (3d Cir. 2013)
(―[S]ettlements are private contracts reflecting negotiated compromises. The role of the
district court is not to determine whether the settlement is the fairest possible
resolution. . . .‖).
279. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07(c) (2010) (―The court,
when feasible, should require the parties to identify a recipient whose interests reasonably
approximate those being pursued by the class.‖); see also In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 180
n.16 (―The judicial role is better limited to approving cy pres recipients selected by the
parties.‖); In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 38 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012) (―[H]aving judges decide how to distribute cy pres awards
both taxes judicial resources and risks creating the appearance of judicial impropriety.‖);
accord Boies & Keith, supra note 23, at 288 (―First, it is preferable that the parties (rather
than the court) select the charities that will receive a cy pres distribution and ideally
articulate such selection clearly in any settlement agreement.‖).
280. Lane, 696 F.3d at 834.
281. See, e.g., id. at 820–21.
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anticipated in settlement agreements,282 charitable settlements are identified
by the parties from the outset and should be included in settlement
notices.283
With this foundational point in place, the question then becomes how to
refine the nexus requirement. Most courts ensure the proposed recipient:
(1) advances the objectives of the underlying statutes (the ―objectives‖
factor), (2) targets the plaintiff class (the ―targets the class‖ factor), and
(3) provides reasonable certainty that any member will be benefitted (the
―reasonable certainty‖ factor).284 However, how courts apply these factors
varies285—which allows objectors to test if a particular judge may entertain
nexus challenges. Clarifying the three factors would simplify the settlement
approval process for charitable settlements and ensure consistency.
First, for the ―objectives‖ factor, courts should define this factor broadly
and consider the objectives of class actions, not just the underlying
claim.286 Courts should be careful not to narrowly fixate on finding the
most ideal organization. As discussed in Part I.A, charitable settlements are
distinct from cy pres in charitable trusts. But even for charitable trusts,
from where the cy pres analogy is drawn, the Restatement Third of Trusts
282. See, e.g., Better v. YRC Worldwide Inc., No. CIV.A. 11-2072-KHV, 2013 WL
4482922, at *10 (D. Kan. Aug. 19, 2013) (―By not identifying the proposed cy pres
recipient, the parties have restricted the Court‘s ability to conduct the searching inquiry
required to approve such a distribution.‖ (citing Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 867
(9th Cir. 2012))).
283. See, e.g., id. (―[T]he failure to designate a proposed cy pres recipient deprives class
members of notice and the ability to object.‖); see also Dennis, 697 F.3d at 867 (discussing
the importance of identifying charitable distribution recipient during the settlement approval
process). But see In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 180 (―Young contends that the settlement
notice was inadequate because it did not identify the cy pres recipients who will receive
excess settlement funds. His primary concern is that unnamed class members will not have
the opportunity to object to the selection of the cy pres recipients, who are intended to serve
as proxies for the class members‘ interests. While a valid concern, failure to identify the cy
pres recipients is not a due process violation.‖).
284. Though this list is often written in the disjunctive (―or‖ instead of ―and‖), judicial
application highlights how all three factors are regularly considered. See, e.g., Nachshin v.
AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011); Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus
Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1990).
285. Compare New York v. Dairylea Coop., Inc., No. 81 Civ. 1891 (RO), 1985 WL 1825,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1985) (detailing wholly charitable settlement that was used to fund
nutrition-related purposes or programs in the same geographic area as the alleged price
fixing among milk wholesalers), with In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp.
2d 1392, 1394 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (―Courts have expanded the cy pres doctrine to also permit
distributions to charitable organizations not directly related to the original claims.‖). For a
thorough discussion of the Motorsports decision, see generally Robert E. Draba, Motorsports
Merchandise: A Cy Pres Distribution Not Quite “As Near As Possible,” 16 LOY. CONSUMER
L. REV. 121, 142 (2004).
286. For example, in Dennis v. Kellogg, consumers claimed Kellogg falsely advertised.
697 F.3d at 858. The $5 million proposed settlement included food distributions to charities
dedicated to feeding the hungry. Id. at 861. The court noted that ―[t]his noble goal [of
feeding the indigent], however, has ‗little or nothing to do with the purposes of the
underlying lawsuit or the class of plaintiffs involved.‘‖ Id. at 866 (quoting Naschin, 663
F.3d at 1039). The court continued: ―Thus, appropriate cy pres recipients are not charities
that feed the needy, but organizations dedicated to protecting consumers from, or redressing
injuries caused by, false advertising.‖ Id. at 867.
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has moved away from ―the next best‖ substitute requirement. Only ―a
charitable purpose that reasonably approximates the designated purpose‖ is
required.287 Courts in the United States and abroad recognize this more
liberal construction of the cy pres doctrine for trusts.288 In fact, the current
Restatement‘s comments support a ―more liberal application of cy pres‖
that does not require the ―nearest possible‖ substitute but rather ―one
reasonably similar.‖289 Thus, holding charitable settlements to a higher
standard than cy pres trusts is highly questionable.
One alternative is to identify a list of presumptively appropriate
recipients, which advances the nexus requirement by ensuring a relationship
between the proposed recipient and charitable distribution.290 Some states
already have adopted this approach for cy pres remainders.291 If either the
American Law Institute or the Judicial Conference of the United States
generated similar lists, parties would have increased certainty about
proposed recipients.292

287. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003).
288. See, e.g., McDonald & Co. Sec., Inc., Gradison Div. v. Alzheimer‘s Disease &
Related Disorders Ass‘n, Inc., 747 N.E.2d 843, 849 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (―In equitable
matters, the court has considerable discretion . . . to fashion any remedy necessary and
appropriate to do justice in a particular case.‖); A.G. for New S. Wales v. Fulham [2002]
NSWSC 629 (Austl.); John K. Eason, Motive, Duty, and the Management of Restricted
Charitable Gifts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 178 (2010).
289. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. (d); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 440 (2009).
290. See, e.g., Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 939, 946 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(explaining how the nexus requirement ensures the recipients ―are not merely ‗worthy‘
recipients with ‗noble goals,‘ but organizations and institutions with demonstrated records of
addressing issues closely related to the matters raised in the complaint‖); Six (6) Mexican
Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1990) (detailing how the
nexus requirement ensures the settlement is ―guided by the objectives of the underlying
statute and the interests of the silent class members‖).
291. See, e.g., IND. R. TRIAL P. 23(F)(2) (requiring partial distribution of cy pres
remainders to the Indiana Bar Foundation and the Indiana Pro Bono Commission); KY. R.
CIV. P. 23.05(6) (requiring partial distribution of cy pres remainders to the Kentucky IOLTA
Fund Board of Trustees); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.10 (2005) (requiring equal distribution of
cy pres remainders to the Indigent Person‘s Attorney Fund and the North Carolina State
Bar); PA. R. CIV. P. 1716 (directing partial distribution of cy pres remainders to the
Pennsylvania IOLTA Board); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 23(f)(2) (requiring distribution of
partial cy pres remainders to the Legal Foundation of Washington).
292. In generating a list, a natural starting point is identifying charities that promote
judicial access, as that is an underlying policy behind all class actions. See, e.g., Safran v.
United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 132 F.R.D. 397, 401 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (―[T]he
general theory behind class action lawsuits . . . [is] to conserve judicial resources and
increase judicial access.‖); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Procedural Vision of Arthur R. Miller:
A Practitioner‟s Tribute, 90 OR. L. REV. 929, 931 (2012) (―The purpose and function of class
actions . . . [is] to provide judicial access to investors, consumers, and tort victims whose
claims, if brought alone, would not survive the expense and delay of solo litigation.‖).
Preidentified charities listed in state statutes could be included as appropriate for cases where
class members are geographically concentrated. Moreover, organizations with broader
geographic impact, appropriately used for nationwide classes, should be included. The
broader category could include the ACLU, the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association‘s Civil Legal Services Division, Legal Services Corporation, and the American
Bar Association.
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Next, to clarify the ―targets the class‖ factor, courts should include an
assessment of the class‘s geographic distribution.293 Currently, both the
Ninth and Eighth Circuits have expressly incorporated this aspect into their
nexus tests.294 This geographic factor is a functional one, as it does not
require the recipient be located in the same place as class members. Rather,
it ensures the proposed use of the funds overlaps with the class
definition.295 For example, in a nationwide consumer class, a Californiabased consumer protection institution can still satisfy the nexus requirement
so long as its work has nationwide impact.296 If, however, the institute only
worked on California-related questions, it would not satisfy the nexus test‘s
geographic factor—not because of its location but because of the limited
reach of its work.297 A narrower definition of the ―targets the class‖ factor
coupled with the broader definition of ―objectives‖ gives courts flexibility
in identifying potential recipients while still promoting a nexus between the
pending litigation and the resulting benefit.
Last, the ―reasonable certainty‖ factor evaluates the propriety of a
proposed charitable recipient. Too often, objectors use this factor as an
open invitation to reargue that direct compensation must occur before any
charitable distribution.298 Such arguments should be outright rejected.
Instead, this factor should focus on the proposed recipient and its plan for
the charitable settlement.

293. Superior Beverage Co., Inc. v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 480 (N.D. Ill.
1993); see also In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 4:99-MD-1264 CEJ, 2013 WL
3212514, at *4 (E.D. Mo. June 24, 2013), vacated and remanded, 775 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir.
2015) (―The geographic scope of the instant case is clear; as lead counsel points out, the
multi-district litigation was transferred to this district because much of the harm suffered by
the class was felt by individuals in the St. Louis region. Therefore, a cy pres distribution to a
regional organization is proper.‖).
294. See, e.g., In re Airline Ticket Comm‘n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir.
2002) (describing the geographic nexus requirement); Powell v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 119 F.3d
703, 705 (8th Cir. 1997) (describing charitable distribution with appropriate geographic
nexus because the settlement program distributed money to the United Negro College Fund
for scholarships in the region class members resided).
295. See, e.g., In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1052 (S.D. Cal.
2013) (―On the whole, the location of the recipient is less important than ‗whether the
projects funded will provide ‗next best‘ relief to the class.‘‖ (quoting In re Lupron Mktg. &
Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 36 (1st Cir. 2012))); Lupron Mktg., 677 F.3d 21 at 36,
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012) (―It is not the location of the recipient which is key; it is
whether the projects funded will provide ‗next best‘ relief to the class.‖).
296. Cf. EasySaver, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 1052 (approving San Diego–based recipient in a
case involving a nationwide class because ―the funds will directly contribute to the national
academic dialogue involving internet privacy and security‖).
297. Cf. Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting
charitable distribution in a nationwide claim against AOL where the recipient only benefited
the Los Angeles area).
298. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1335–36
(S.D. Fla. 2011); New York v. Dairylea Coop., Inc., No. 81 CIV. 1891 (RO), 1985 WL
1825, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1985).

3286

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

Preference should be given to charities rated by an independent
organization.299 Grades of ―C‖ or lower should be presumptively
inadequate for purposes of Rule 23(e). Three well-respected watchdog
organizations that provide such ratings are the American Institute of
Philanthropy, Better Business Bureau‘s Wise Giving Alliance, and Charity
Navigator.300
When a charity grade is unavailable, the charity‘s
administrative overhead costs should be presented to the court.301 The
court should assess this by considering information on employment
compensation and administrative overhead—as these amounts indicate how
much money will actually be used to advance the organization‘s mission.302
Consequently, preference will be given to preexisting organizations, since
new ones lack data about administrative costs.303 Thus, in the recent
Facebook case, where the proposed recipient was a newly formed
organization, the court was correct in noting, ―we have never held that
[charitable distribution] funds must go to extant charities in order to survive
fairness review.‖304 However, under the principles proposed in this Article,
the court should have interrogated why a new organization was warranted.
Further, the settlement agreement should lay out how the intended
recipient will use the money. To date, courts have been inconsistent on the
breadth and detail required. Sometimes generic promises to promote
consumer rights or research sufficed.305 Parties should provide a detailed
299. See, e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The “Independent” Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity
and the Limits of Autonomy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 51, 118 (2012) (discussing charitable
grading).
300. See, e.g., KARL E. EMERSON, STATE SOLICITATION REQUIREMENTS (2006), available
at 2006 WL 5839022, at *7 (listing these three organizations as the primary private charity
watchdogs); see also Karen Donnelly, Good Governance: Has the IRS Usurped the
Business Judgment of Tax-Exempt Organizations in the Name of Transparency and
Accountability?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 163, 168 (2010); Jennifer Miller Oertel et al., Proving
That They Are Doing Good: What Attorneys and Other Advisers Need to Know About
Program Assessment, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 693, 699–700 (2013) (detailing Charity
Navigator‘s rating process).
301. This information is publicly available for over 850,000 charities. See GUIDESTAR,
www.guidestar.org (last visited Apr. 23, 2015) (providing financial reporting on charities,
including overhead costs). If a particular proposed charity is not listed, such information
should still be proffered to the court. Charities are interested in receiving charitable
settlement funds. They are motivated to provide this information, so obtaining such
information should not be particularly onerous.
302. See Lewis, supra note 266 (describing how to assess how much was spent on
program services versus general and administrative costs).
303. This is not intended as an absolute rule, as there could be instances where the
preexisting charity has other problems—such as high administrative overhead or too narrow
a geographic reach. But if there is an alternative, preexisting charity that does not raise any
obvious red flags, the parties should bear a heavier burden to prove distribution to a new
organization is warranted. This allows trial courts to consider the organization‘s track
record, as well as helps to ensure the money received is not exhausted by set-up costs for a
new organization.
304. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2012).
305. See, e.g., In re Google Buzz Privacy Litig., No. C 10-00672 JW, 2011 WL 7460099,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011) (approving settlement with distribution for consumer
protection); In re Publ‘n Paper Antitrust Litig., No. 3:04MD1631SRU, 2009 WL 2351724,
at *2 (D. Conn. July 30, 2009) (approving charitable distribution to ―charitable institutions
designed to guard against antitrust injury and protect consumers‖).
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plan on how to use the money as part of the settlement approval process.306
This will help the court evaluate whether the recipient has the experience
and know-how to fulfill the distribution‘s intended purpose. Minute detail
is not needed, but the court should be confident the recipient has a plan and
is well-positioned to execute it.307 Further, requiring continued reports to
ensure the plan is fulfilled maximizes the benefits derived from charitable
settlements.308
Promotion of a clearer nexus requirement assists courts and class
members. These revisions provide courts more information to evaluate
proposed charities and distributions. This information then can be passed
on to class members in settlement notices, thus averting wasteful
objections.
C. Calculating Attorneys‟ Fees for Charitable Settlements
Third, objectors often attempt an end-run attack on charitable
settlements. In addition to challenging the distributions, objectors regularly
challenge fee petitions in charitable settlements, contending money that
goes to charity should not be included in calculating attorneys‘ fees.309 In
support, objectors rely on what some courts have called ―red flags‖—or
factors that suggest a collusive or problematic settlement. As previously
listed in Part I,310 these red flags are: (1) a high percentage of the
settlement going to charity;311 (2) clear sailing provisions—whereby
defendants agree not to contest fee awards up to a certain monetary
306. See, e.g., Lane, 696 F.3d at 822, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (discussing how
the settlement agreement articulated ―exactly how funds will be used—to ‗fund and sponsor
programs designed to educate users, regulators[,] and enterprises regarding critical issues
relating to protection of identity and personal information online through user control, and
the protection of users from online threats‘‖).
307. See, e.g., Diamond Chem. Co., Inc. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., Nos. 01 2118
(CKK), 02-1018 (CKK), 2007 WL 2007447, at *3 (D.D.C. July 10, 2007) (―In addition to
arguing about the hypothetical virtues of the proposed Center, Class Plaintiff provides the
Court with significant concrete detail as to both the mission and the nascent plans for the
proposed Center.‖); accord Foer, supra note 95, at 89 (discussing proposed best practices for
antitrust cy pres).
308. See, e.g., In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 38–39 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012) (requiring annual reports to the court to ―ensure that the
cy pres fund is distributed in a way that is both financially sound and comports with the
interests of the class and that the auditing function will not fall on the district court‖).
309. See, e.g., In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1053 (S.D. Cal.
2013); In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. M 07-1827 SI, 2013 WL 1365900,
at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2013); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 282 F.R.D. 92, 121
(D.N.J. 2012); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1367 (S.D.
Fla. 2011); In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 689 F. Supp. 2d 297, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
These challenges are not limited to charitable distributions. Rather, generic objections to fee
petitions are an epidemic in class actions. See, e.g., Spark v. MBNA Corp., 289 F. Supp. 2d
510, 514 (D. Del. 2003) (―The objector‘s ‗opposition‘ to class counsel‘s fee petition appears
to be nothing more than an attempt to receive attorneys‘ fees.‖). See generally Greenberg,
supra note 114, at 950 (detailing meritless objections and the problems they pose to
enforcement and deterrence goals).
310. See supra Part I.B.
311. See Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 952 (7th Cir. 2006); Crawford v.
Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2000).
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value;312 and (3) reverters, or settlements where unclaimed funds return to
the defendant.313 If successful in convincing the court to reduce the fee
award, objectors stand to gain—fee reduction is a basis for objectors to
request fees of their own.314 Hence, objectors have financial motivation to
recycle claims that charitable settlements are not beneficial to class
members.315 As Professor Hay explained, ―Among critics, the contention
that class members have received too little in a class settlement almost
always is accompanied by the corresponding charge that class‘[s] counsel
has received too much.‖316
Rather than fostering such objections, the better course is to clarify how
to calculate attorneys‘ fees for charitable settlements. To begin, when the
revised trigger and nexus requirements are satisfied, the charitable
distribution should not alter the attorneys‘ fee evaluation. Such settlements
should be treated the same as any other monetary settlement. A contrary
position risks underenforcement.317 The next step is revising the ―red
flags‖ as the current ones do not identify problematic settlements and lead
to false positives, thus generating unsubstantiated fears of collusion.
Fee awards are essential for class actions to supplement enforcement of
key substantive laws.318 The potential to recover fees incentivizes class

312. Lobatz v. U.S. W. Cellular, Inc., 222 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (detailing the
alleged dangers of clear sailing provisions); see Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925
F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991) (―[L]awyers might urge a class settlement at a low figure or on
a less-than-optimal basis in exchange for red-carpet treatment on fees.‖).
313. In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011);
Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir. 2004).
314. See Petruzzi‘s Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., Inc., 983 F. Supp. 595, 622 (M.D. Pa. 1996)
(using lodestar analysis, the court noted that the objector ―will only be compensated for
hours which were expended in a manner that benefitted that class as a whole‖); cf. In re
Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 2d 751, 753 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (―An objector
to a class-action settlement is not normally entitled to a fee award unless he confers a benefit
on the class.‖).
315. See Barnes v. Fleet Bos. Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395-NG, 2006 WL 6916834, at *3 (D.
Mass. Aug. 22, 2006) (―Repeat objectors to class action settlements can make a living
simply by filing frivolous appeals and thereby slowing down the execution of settlements.‖);
Spark v. MBNA Corp., 289 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 (D. Del. 2003) (stating that groundless
objection by serial objector counsel ―appears to be nothing more than an attempt to receive
attorneys‘ fees‖); Greenberg, supra note 114, at 963 (―Thus, perversely, professional
objectors have purely monetary incentives to find even a quibble to raise in opposition to a
settlement—even as class counsel and the court are bound to ensure that the settlement is
within the range of reasonableness.‖).
316. Hay, supra note 198, at 1433.
317. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer
Protection Liability: An Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 23 (explaining
how attorneys‘ fees play a role in private enforcement); Fitzpatrick, supra note 23, at 2057
(discussing that fee awards are a necessary aspect of class actions‘ deterrence potential).
318. See, e.g., Ressler v. Jacobson, 149 F.R.D. 651, 657 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (―Attorneys
who bring class actions are acting as ‗private attorneys general‘ and are vital to the
enforcement of the securities laws. Accordingly, public policy favors the granting of
counsel fees sufficient to reward counsel for bringing these actions and to encourage them to
bring additional such actions.‖); Laura K. Abel & David S. Udell, If You Gag the Lawyers,
Do You Choke the Courts? Some Implications for Judges When Funding Restrictions Curb
Advocacy by Lawyers on Behalf of the Poor, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 873 (2002).
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action attorneys to front fees and expenses and undertake risky, complex
litigation. As Judge Manning noted:
If the class members had to file individual suits seeking $100–$1,000
each and had to pay attorneys‘ fees for each case, they would likely not
bother, and if they did, they would still receive a pittance if they received
any money at all. Congress has elected to allow class actions to create an
incentive for lawyers to take cases where the recovery of individual class
members creates a disincentive to file suit. 319

This policy goal is particularly applicable to small sum cases, where but
for potential fees such claims would likely not be brought.320 Hence, fees
ward against creating an immunity carve-out, whereby defendants could
avoid liability simply by keeping individual damages low enough to make
litigation unrealistic.
In fact, these policy arguments are partially why most courts, including
the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits, have considered charitable
distributions in calculating fee awards.321 As the Third Circuit recently
explained,
We think it unwise to impose, as [an objector] requests, a rule requiring
district courts to discount attorneys‘ fees when a portion of an award will
be distributed [to charity] . . . . Nor do we want to discourage counsel
from filing class actions in cases where few claims are likely to be made
but the deterrent effect of the class action is equally valuable. 322

While the Supreme Court has yet to address the question, including
charitable distributions in computing settlement values would be a logical
extension of prior precedent. In Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert,323 the Supreme
Court affirmed a fee application that used the entire settlement to calculate
fees, even though part of the settlement reverted to the defendant.324 Since
a reversion can count for calculating fees, a charitable distribution, which is
more valuable for class members, should as well.325 Hence, in terms of

319. Murray v. Cingular Wireless II, LLC, 242 F.R.D. 415, 421 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
320. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1760–61 (2011) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (―The maximum gain to a customer for the hassle of a $30.22 dispute is still
$30.22. What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in
litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?‖).
321. See, e.g., Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 437 (2d Cir.
2007). In Masters, the court explained:
The entire Fund, and not some portion thereof, is created through the efforts of
counsel at the instigation of the entire class. An allocation of fees by percentage
should therefore be awarded on the basis of the total funds made available,
whether claimed or not. We side with the circuits that take this approach.
Id.; see also Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th
Cir. 1990) (―Nothing in this case requires departure from the 25 percent standard award.‖).
322. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 178 (3d Cir. 2013).
323. 444 U.S. 472 (1980).
324. Id. at 480–81.
325. That said, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a fair bit of animus toward class
actions. Hence, it is possible the Court will distinguish Van Gemert. As Justice Kagan
noted in her dissent to American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, ―To a hammer,
everything looks like a nail. And to a Court bent on diminishing the usefulness of Rule 23,
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policy and precedent, including charitable settlements for calculating
attorneys‘ fees is the proper course. This ensures the regulatory
enforcement goals of class actions remain at the forefront of Rule 23.
Nonetheless, objectors still rely on red flags to challenge such petitions.
Yet, these red flags are just another vestige of conflating cy pres and
charitable settlements that results in wasteful false-positives. These red
flags need substantial revision to effectively identify collusive settlements.
First, objectors often contend charitable distributions result in
disproportionate awards to class counsel, when compared to the amount
class members receive.326 However, a charity receiving a high percentage
of the settlement indicates a distribution problem, not collusion.
Admittedly, with such settlements, class counsel receive more money than
class members.327 But, this is also true for non-charitable class action
settlements. Only the percentage of the attorneys‘ fees compared to the
overall settlement value is possible indicia of a problematic fee request.328
No evidence suggests that attorneys receive bigger payouts from charitable
settlements than other kinds of class action settlements.
Second, the red flags are not particularly helpful in identifying collusion
because while a reverter raises the specter of a suspect settlement, a
charitable distribution does not. A reverter undermines a defendant‘s
incentive to support the claims process, which is problematic because
defendants often possess the essential information to successfully notify
class members of a pending settlement.329 Moreover, reverters have no
deterrence benefits.330 In contrast, with a charitable distribution, parties do
not gain by weakening the settlement notice process and such distributions
support deterrence. Consequently, the red flags are suspect because they
incorrectly treat charitable settlements and reverters as equally

everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled.‖ See Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
326. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 8 (2013); In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1738 (BMC) (JO), 2012
WL 5289514, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2012).
327. See, e.g., Lane, 696 F.3d at 820–21.
328. For example, in In re Bluetooth, the court vacated an attorney fee award in an
amount eight times the charitable distribution. In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011).
Even there, however, there was reason to assume collusion. The court vacated the settlement
and attorney fee approval, directing the trial court to further evaluate the equity of the
settlement. In doing so, the court did acknowledge that the trial court ultimately approved
the award, noting it ―express[ed] no opinion on the ultimate fairness of what the parties have
negotiated.‖ Id. at 950.
329. Many criticisms of class actions focus on class action lawyers, without discussing
the role of defendants. While defendants do not owe a duty to class members, by the time a
settlement is reached, both class counsel and defendants‘ counsel should have a shared
incentive to promote the settlement. Cf. Bassett, supra note 208, at 539 (discussing how the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 applies to both defendants and plaintiffs).
330. In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1395 (N.D. Ga.
2001) (―[T]he substantive policies underlying the statutes upon which the plaintiffs sued
would dictate a preference for an appropriate cy pres distribution rather than a reversion of
undistributed funds to the defendant, the alleged wrongdoer . . . .‖ (quoting NEWBERG &
CONTE, supra note 54, § 11.20)).
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questionable. Instead, charitable distributions should be included in fee
award calculations.
Third, clear sailing provisions—agreements by the parties not to
challenge class counsels‘ fee petition—are not necessarily problematic.
When fee arrangements are negotiated, after settlement resolution and in the
presence of an experienced mediator, concerns of collusion dissipate.331
Instead, it is the presence of a reverter that again raises concerns.332 As the
Ninth Circuit explains, ―The clear sailing provision reveals the defendant‘s
willingness to pay, but the [reverter] deprives the class of that full potential
benefit if class counsel negotiates too much for its fees.‖333 The mere
―willingness to pay,‖ signaled by the clear sailing provision, is not
particularly helpful for the court‘s assessment of a fee petition, as it invites
baseless objections.
Hence, the current red flags do not necessarily help courts identify
suspect fee requests. Rather, they provide objectors a legal hook to raise
red herring arguments. A better alternative is using preexisting, wellestablished criteria for fee awards in class actions generally. These include:
(1) the size of the fund created and the number of persons benefited; (2) the
presence or absence of substantial objections by members of the class to the
fees requested by counsel; (3) the skill and efficiency of the attorneys
involved; (4) the complexity and duration of the litigation; (5) the risk of
nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to the case by plaintiff‘s
counsel; and (7) the awards in similar cases.334 Charitable distributions
should be counted in calculating the size of the fund and should not alter
these other criteria so long as: (1) the trigger and nexus requirements are
met; (2) no reverter is involved; and (3) fees are agreed upon after
settlement fund negotiations are complete and in the presence of a mediator.
Though modest in design, the proposed alterations to judicial review
provide substantial teeth for evaluating charitable settlements, thus
maintaining the integrity of Rule 23(e) while avoiding further
inconsistency. When the revised trigger, nexus, and fee guidelines are
fulfilled, objectors should have to pay to play, making them responsible to
reimburse the parties‘ time and expenses incurred in responding to generic
challenges.
331. See supra Part II.B (discussing why collusion fears are overblown).
332. See, e.g., Sylvester v. CIGNA Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45 (D. Me. 2005)
(―Specifically, the Court remains troubled by the combination of the reverter clause and the
clear sailing provision. In concert, the Court believes that these two provisions give rise to
inferences that there was a lack of arm‘s length negotiations and a lack of zealous advocacy
for the Class by Plaintiffs‘ counsel.‖); Ralph C. Ferrara & Riva Khoshaba Parker, Tontine or
Takeback: Reversion Provisions in Class Action Settlement Agreements, 62 BUS. LAW. 971,
979 (2007) (discussing the troublesome ―interrelation of the reversion and clear sailing
provision‖).
333. In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 949.
334. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 582 F.3d 524, 541 (3d Cir. 2009);
Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2007); In re AT&T
Corp., 455 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting these factors overlap with the criteria for
evaluating the adequacy of a settlement); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d
96, 121 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 719 (7th Cir. 2001).
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CONCLUSION
This Article confronts the erosion of class action procedures. It takes a
stand to protect against an attack on settlement procedures that further
aggregate litigation‘s regulatory purpose. Charitable settlements offer
efficient, equitable solutions for cases where individual distributions are
problematic. Denying charitable settlements runs the risk of strangling
small-stakes cases in their cradle: there is little reason to file a claim if
there is no realistic way to bring the case to conclusion.
The case for charitable settlements advanced in this Article accepts the
assumption that one purpose of class action damages under Rule 23(b)(3) is
to provide class members individual monetary distributions—but that is
hardly the sole purpose of class actions. The argument here is one based in
reality rather than the abstract. Sometimes individual distributions simply
make little sense. Recognizing this, charitable settlements‘ judicial access
and deterrence gains far outweigh any imagined theoretical challenges
against them.
This Article provides the necessary starting point for saving charitable
settlements. Distinguishing charitable settlements from cy pres remainders
advances scholarly evaluation of these distinct settlement structures. When
viewed in isolation, charitable settlements‘ utility becomes apparent.
Through minor modifications to the criteria for evaluating such settlements
and accompanying fee petitions, courts can clear the path for charitable
settlements—a path that saves not only charitable settlements but also
preserves class actions‘ larger regulatory goals.

